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Abstract 
Copyright is in the line of fire; if our times are in the hands of digital (r)evolution more 
than ever before, the abolishment of all barriers as no longer relevant to the end of 
conventionality, doubts or even contests the substance of traditional legal regimes. 
Uniquely encircling and enveloping creativity with the mantle of law, thus preserving 
its own existence and continuity, copyright has to remind its very essence as reflected 
in its own philosophy, structure and development. If everyone asks (or questions) 
“what” is to be protected, “why” is this protection afforded, and “how” shall the line 
be drawn, idea/expression dichotomy is this principle -as the fundamental axiom of 
copyright law- that will unambiguously and effectively response. Founded on the core 
of copyright, it draws around its periphery a number of concentric circles that 
demonstrate its profound significance; its twofold purpose as serving both the creator 
and the public, the rights of the one and the rights of the others, “translated” into the 
legal monopoly conferred upon the author, and the principle of access. Embracing the 
conflicts arising and imposing the primordial propitiatory limitation, this essential 
division is voicing the pursue of fairness, the balance that copyright remarkably 
achieved and that constantly fights to achieve, even if “tormented” by diverging 
perceptions.  
 
This research is not only an exploration of idea/expression dichotomy; it is an 
investigation on the real physiognomy of copyright law in both theoretical and judicial 
contours, forming a comparative analysis between the civil law and common law 
copyright traditions, while further deepening in the case - law of the United States, 
since demonstrating the two principal issues: Abstraction and the “How Much” 
question. Seeking a “fair interaction”, a “fair balance”, a “fair dealing”, or a “fair use”, 
the scope, the depth, and the edges of protection are signified through 
idea/expression dichotomy in all its magnificent (and difficult) dimensions. This is not 
the end of copyright, it is only its reinvention; and if we return to its roots, we may find 
the consensus needed and eventually go forward. 
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Preface 
Law is strict and rigid, predictable and consistent, establishing boundaries and drawing 
lines in order to strike a balance between opposing aims and conflicted interests; it 
demands for respect, it requires the consideration of the others, it is the “us” that 
prevails the ego. Creativity as Art, as Creation, as any Expression, is tolerant and 
malleable, changeable and unlimited, carved by shapes and forms that break the rules 
as the “most ungenerated act of freedom”. It is neither demanding, nor “punishing”, it 
is the celebration of individuality as uniquely and independently expressed. Hence, 
Law and Creativity are not separate paths that run in parallel, only momentarily 
crossing one another. They are meld like rivers which flow on the same sea, integrated 
into an indivisible entirety; and it is Copyright law that draws this circular 
completeness, that does not merely construct a crossroad, but, in effect, builds a new 
route of unity and harmony between these apparently contradicting aspects of human 
existence.  
Intended and devoted to encouraging creativity, copyright law counted on the 
“fair interaction” between the individuals as the organs of the society, and society 
itself, continuously struggling to reconsider, to predict, or at least, to respond to the 
unceasingly changeable individual and collective needs and demands, as broadly 
construed under the norm of “opposing or competing rights and interests”. However, 
it has been intensively regarded as not sufficient, or vigorous, or effective enough to 
achieve the “fair balance” that it always sought to reach, especially in the light of the 
digital era. In this sense, the problematics of divergency and inconsistency that had 
admittedly “tormented” copyright law, became the most forceful argumentation 
against its own validity and significance, and idea/expression dichotomy -as its most 
fundamental principle- could not avoid this “inevitable fate”.  
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For all these reasons, a return to the roots of copyright and its substantive axioms that 
have both influenced and have been themselves affected by the intertemporal 
objective to encompass and respond to the challenges carved by the sign of the times, 
illustrated idea/expression dichotomy as the most fundamental principle of reason, 
structure and development of copyright law, under which the scope, the depth and the 
edges of copyright protection are determined. The theoretical investigation into each 
of its substantive pillars and their intersection, along with the case – study on its 
implementation among different jurisdictions, in both civil law and common law 
copyright traditions, was nothing less than a fascinating task under this research. The 
motivation was transfigured into a question posed: Is there a fault in Copyright law, or 
it shall be invented anew? 
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Introduction 
Copyright is founded on two substantive and solid pillars that “embody” its 
monumental desire to develop and maintain the protection of the rights of the 
authors, along with the profound recognition of the need to reach, sustain and 
preserve a balance between the creators and the “larger public interest”1; if the 
appropriate form of protection as offered to the authors has been actualized through 
the granting of absolute and exclusive rights over their works, the rights and interests 
of the public, coincided with the principle of “public benefit”, are realized through the 
right to access copyrighted resources. And this constitutes the fundamental objective 
of copyright law, consisting simultaneously, though, the conflict that agonizes 
copyright law since its conception and traverses its whole existence and formulation. 
Idea/expression dichotomy, as inexorably intertwined with originality, consists the 
“backbone” of copyright law as the most “substantial and concrete form of 
protection”2, providing for all the answers sought. Indeed, the division between an 
idea and its particular conceptualization as independently, individually and uniquely 
expressed has formed (and still forms) the sharp line of demarcation between the 
unprotected elements of a work of authorship and the subject - matter of copyright 
protection; between the “common property” and the private right to intellectual 
creation; between the public interest in terms of social progress, and the individual 
concern and inherent need for self-expression, actualization and fulfillment.   
 
Chapter I explores the philosophy of copyright law, the rationale behind its proprietary 
nature, the misconception of the deriving principle of exclusivity, and the role of 
idea/expression dichotomy as drawing the line between the “body” and the “soul” of a 
copyrighted work. Moreover, the concept of “exceptions and limitations” and its 
effective power in the structure and evolution of copyright law is explored, since 
demonstrating its twofold motivation that profoundly lays the foundations on which 
idea/expression dichotomy rests.  
                                                 
1 Aligned, in particular, with the realms of “education, research and access to information, as reflected 
in the Berne Convention”. Preamble of 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT). 
2 Stamatoudi, Irini, “Copyright and Multimedia Products, A Comparative Analysis”, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p. 6 
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Chapter II deepens in the norms of “idea” and “expression”, further presenting the 
codification of the dichotomy around the world as a rule of law, while focusing on the 
example of Greece, as a judicially formulated concept. Furthermore, the diverging 
copyright traditions between the civil law and common law systems are analyzed, 
reflecting, as such, the principle of territoriality, which had inevitably affected the 
status and implementation of the division between an idea and its expression; in this 
regard, the requirement of fixation as contradicting with the principle of copyright’s 
automatic protection, and the interconnection and interdependence of 
idea/expression dichotomy with the fundamental doctrine of originality, intends to 
shed light on the reasoning behind any judicial determination of copyright 
infringement, as interwoven with the scope and very essence of copyright. Chapter III 
emphasizes on “where” and “how” has the line been drawn, while setting the 
“problematic” of idea/expression dichotomy as the “root” of the legal uncertainty 
observed around the copyright world. Exploring the methodologies and the tests 
adopted for the identification of the protectable and non-protectable elements of a 
work, the differentiated standards and definitions applying, along with the results 
reached on a case-by-case determination, the outcome reached is that 
notwithstanding the diverging or even contradicting perspectives from which the civil 
law and common law copyright traditions originate, they both seek “fairness” as the 
reflection of the balance that copyright is destined and intended to reach; and as such, 
the ending of the thread unrolled “meets” again its beginning...  
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I. THE PHILOSOPHY AND PHYSIOGNOMY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
1.1. Copyright as “Property” and the Exclusivity Debate 
Copyright exists, grows and evolves within the realm of Intellectual Property3, identified 
as the most powerful and effective mechanism in order to build and preserve the so-
called creative advantage; this (content -in terms of copyright-) advantage is further 
construed as the starting point for achieving a breathing (economic) space that in turn 
operates and succeeds through the recognition of a legal monopoly, namely through the 
establishment of absolute and exclusive proprietary rights to intellectual property 
owners.4  
 
 
                                                 
3 Since copyright consists a significant installment of the Intellectual Property system, as inextricably 
aligned with “culture, knowledge, digitisation projects, online markets and new technologies”. 
Stamatoudi, Irini and Torremans, Paul, “EU Copyright Law: A Commentary”, Edward Elgar Publishing: Elgar 
Commentaries Series, 2014, p.1  
4 Pike, Christopher G., “Virtual Monopoly: Building an Intellectual Property Strategy for Creative 
Advantage--From Patents to Trademarks, From Copyrights to Design Rights”, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 
2001. Indeed, it has been realized since the establishment of the 1886 Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (consisting the first multilateral treaty in the area and as a 
consequence, the origins of any later legislative initiative), that the “effective and uniform” manner 
through which the authors of qualified as copyrighted works will be adequately protected, is the exclusive 
character of the rights that shall be attributed to them (articles 8, 9, 11, 11bis, 11ter, 12, 13, 14). Being 
further recognized (in the convention’s preamble) as the animus of all contracting parties, this rights-
based approach has been construed as “one of the fundamental cornerstones of the modern intellectual 
property system”, on which every modern legislative instrument in the area also focuses on. Ricketson, 
Sam, “The Berne Convention: The Continued Relevance of an Ancient Text”, in “Intellectual Property and 
the New Millennium: Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish”, Vaver, David and Bently, Bionel (Eds), 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 221. Remaining in the international level, the exclusive control 
granted to authors over their creations has been further implemented in 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT, articles 6-8), while the “effective” protection desired (and afforded) to performers and producers 
of phonograms (as related rights holders) has been also realized through the recognition of exclusive 
rights under the 1999 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT, articles 6 – 14). Moreover, in 
the regional level, the 2001/29/EC Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society (hereinafter “Infosoc Directive”) has also clearly stated that 
member – states shall provide to both copyright and related rights holders the “exclusive right” to 
authorize or prohibit the further exploitation of their works as specifically defined under the scope of the 
law (articles 2 – 4). Despite the diverging copyright traditions in civil law and common law jurisdictions, 
the principle of exclusivity has been implemented in both legal systems: for example, Copyright Law of the 
United States (a common law system) has dictated that “the Congress shall have Power... To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Tımes to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”. In the national level, Greece (a civil law jurisdiction), 
provides under Copyright Act No. 2121/1993 that “intellectual authors shall have, with the creation of the 
work, the right of copyright over that work, which includes, as exclusive and absolute rights, the right to 
exploit the work (economic right) and the right to protect their personal connection with the work (moral 
right) (article 1§1). 
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In terms of copyright, if “absolute” means a right that belongs only to the author (or 
more accurately, to the copyright holder), “exclusive” signifies a rightful control 
exercised towards all, meaning that it is asserted against anyone, and actually or 
potentially, directly or obliquely violated by anyone. This virtual in nature -thus deriving 
from the intangible character of all intellectual property rights5- and moreover, 
temporarily sustained and self – limited6 exclusivity has been characterized as a 
“delicate balancing act”7 under the scope of encouraging creativity, consisting the 
rationale behind and the solid foundations on which copyright law has been worldwide 
structured and developed8. Deepening in this pivotal objective, its implementation has 
outlined the principle of exclusivity as its central axis, defined as the right of the author 
to exclude the others from something that he owns.9  
                                                 
5 Thus, protecting the “creations of the mind” which further fall within two divided branches, respectively 
consisted from i) the copyright and related rights’ field of protection and ii) the industrial property 
classification in which trademarks, trade-secrets, industrial designs, geographical indications and technical 
inventions (as patents) are included. Read more about the IP’s general framework at: “What is Intellectual 
Property”, WIPO Publication No.450(E), online available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_450.pdf, and with regard to 
industrial property at: “Understanding Industrial Property”, WIPO Publication, 2nd ed., 2016, online 
available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_895_2016.pdf, as accessed in October 
2017. 
6 Thus, granted to the copyright owner for a limited timeframe (during his lifetime and usually seventy 
(70) years after his death); after the expiration of this time-limit, copyright expires pes se, thus falling 
within the public domain regime. Moreover, the heart’s content of copyright may be itself narrowed by a 
number of exhaustively provided exceptions and limitations for the sake of public interest. 
7 Reflecting the dual motivation of copyright law to protect and reward the author, while concurrently 
“advancing the public welfare”. As a result, the legal monopoly conferred upon the author of a 
copyrighted work shall incentivize the further creation and distribution of works, while not unduly 
increasing the “cost of public access or impede the work of future creators”. Garfield, Alan, “Copyright 
Law's Delicate Balancing Act”, Delaware Lawyer, Vol. 35, Issue 3, 2017 
8 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) underlines (in its preamble) the “outstanding significance of 
copyright protection as an incentive for literary and artistic creation”, while in EU Copyright law, the 
“Infosoc Directive” emphasizes on a high level of protection of intellectual property which “will foster 
substantial investment in creativity and innovation”, contributing as such to the smooth functioning of the 
internal market. This high level of protection is further coincided with the protection of the authors’ rights 
which are “crucial to intellectual creations”, ensuring as such the “maintenance and development of 
creativity in the interests of authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public 
at large”. It should be mentioned that, in this context, intellectual property has been recognized as an 
“integral part of property”. 
9 The right to exclude the others -described as the very essence of the “bundle” of rights integrated into 
property- has been characterized as the “sine qua non” of property right, applying correspondingly to 
copyright. This attribution stands on the premise that if denying someone the exclusion right, “they do 
not have property” at all. Merrill, Thomas W., “Property and the Right to Exclude”, Nebraska Law Review, 
Vol. 77, Issue 4, Article 7, 1998, p. 730, online available at: 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1492&context=nlr, as accessed in October 
2017. 
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Shaped as, affected by and, in any case, interrelated with property law in a schematic 
analogy10, the intellectual property system “borrows”, inter alia, the concept of 
ownership to a physical object to transfigure it to the notion of authorship to an 
intangible article, construed, in both cases, as the exclusive right to control access to 
what derives from and belongs to the private sphere11. However, this erga omnes 
application of the right to exclude, as uniformly recognized in copyright law 
notwithstanding its diverging origins12, has been often misconstrued as installing a 
concealed absolutum dominium that is further argued to have been implicitly (and 
unacceptably) accepted. 
 
 
                                                 
10 As the (intangible) rights conferred upon to copyright holders are “analogous to the rights of ordinary 
property owners”, consisting as such the “intellectual property equivalents” of the rights belonging to 
(tangible) property owners. In this sense, a copyright owner is “similar” or “equal” to the owner of a 
tangible property, as they both share the exclusive entitlement over their “assets” and the coincided right 
to exclude, as provided by the property regime; this similarity is also apparent in the assignment and 
value of copyrighted works, and in the provisions governing the transfer of copyright which respectively 
require for a voluntary transaction that is only valid if conducted in a written form and accompanied by 
the transferor’s signature. Liu, Adrian, “Copyright as Quasi-Public Property: Reinterpreting the Conflict 
between Copyright and the First Amendment”, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment 
Law Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 384, 405-406. In addition, this analogy is profound if considering 
the whole “bundle” of property rights -beyond the right to exclude- which applies in both tangible and 
intangible resources (under a differentiated, though, type and degree). Thus, the rights “commonly 
associated with property” are the right to use, to transfigure, to transfer (during life) and to devise upon 
death. See n.5, pp. 741 – 744. Similarly, copyright is the absolute and exclusive right to use a “work”, 
namely to authorize or prohibit any further exploitation (reproduction, distribution, making available to 
the public etc.) of an intangible resource, including the right of adaptation as the right to control any 
modification, transformation or alteration of a work. In addition, the copyright owner’s economic rights 
may be analogously transferred or licensed to third – parties, or inherited after the author’s death, while 
his moral rights are also descendible to his heirs, displaying, though, the difference that they cannot -in 
principle- be waived or transferred inter vivos.   
11 As “intellectual rights are private rights”, Preamble of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Agreement (1994 WTO TRIPS Agreement).  
12 Under the “romantic” conception of copyright as enhanced in the civil law “droit d’ auteur” systems 
-considered as “more favorable” to authors-, the bottom-line of the exclusive character of the rights 
afforded to copyright holders is based on the recognition of authorship and individual creativity, being 
further actualized through the establishment of an economic return, namely the rewarding of the author 
for his own intellectual creations. In contrast, copyright’s utilitarian perceptive “treats a work like a fenced 
property or possessed object”, thus applying to copyright the traditional title of ownership and the 
relevant right to exploit the asset’s economic value. In both cases, however, the underlying purpose 
remains the same, namely to incentivize the author to create further, contributing, as such, to the benefit 
of society, while the essence of the legal rights afforded to the copyright owner is the exclusive character 
of the right to control any dimension of the “circle of life” of a work. Rice, David A., “Copyright as 
Talisman: Expanding 'Property' in Digital Works”, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 
Volume 16, 2002, pp. 114 - 116  
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From that standpoint, if copyright is property, and if property is coincided with the right 
to exclude, then copyright holders become “despotically” dominant over “each and 
every possible use of a work”, consisting as such the root cause of the alleged 
copyright’s overexpansion. Consequently, it has been suggested that “intellectual 
property” should be reinvented as “intellectual policy”, thus considering (or 
disregarding) the whole property theory as a mere defense to intellectual theft, while 
also insisting that copyright does not (or should not) consist a property but a policy13, 
even alleging that its existing realm “threatens" the free flow of information and 
democratic dialogue in a broader sense.14 However, this point of view not only neglects 
the philosophy and essence of copyright as a system of rules, but also circumvents the 
scope and the fundamental structure of the law per se. If everything comes and evolves 
from a “why”, law is not just a simple question; it is the “question of balance” that has 
(each time) to be appropriately answered as a policy-making decision. Correspondingly, 
the state of the law is a “state of equilibrium”; it is not just the voice of people, it is also 
the voice of those who cannot be heard. It is not only the statutory formulation of a 
social will but for most, it is the actualization of a “social order which could only be 
achieved through a balance between opposing interests”. As a result, law is founded on 
the principle of balance and respectively, copyright is built in flexibilities. And this crucial 
framework inherently incorporates the recognition that “there cannot be an absolute 
right which could be exercised in a totally selfish manner with no consideration for the 
consequences its exercise involves”.15  
 
                                                 
13 Forming, in addition, the “Property Problem”, issued by the so-called internet exceptionalists with 
respect to digital copyright; under this perceptive, the application of traditional property entitlements on 
the internet endangers the digital era’s inherent freedom and “creative potential”, thus considering the 
new forms of expression in digital media as a “common culture” that is unjustifiably restricted by the 
authors’ virtual monopoly over their works. Mossoff, Adam, “Is Copyright Property”, San Diego Law 
Review, Vol. 42, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 29-31, 33. 
14 Vaidhyanathan, Siva, “Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it 
Threatens Creativity”, New York University Press, 2001 
15 It is the fundamental “concept of balance”, as the organizational structure and the structural strength of 
the law (and copyright law) per se, that dictates that there are no selfish or despotic rights but only rights 
which are “relativized” by the rights of the others and “the well-being and general interest” of society. 
This profound doctrine consists simultaneously the rationale behind the exceptions imposed as limitations 
to exclusive rights. Kotsiris, Lambros, “Some Reflections on the Copyright’s Path To-Day”, in “Copyright 
and the Digital Agenda for Europe: Current Regulations and Challenges for the Future”, Stamatoudi, Irini 
(Ed.), P.N. Sakkoulas, 2015, pp. 165-166 
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If the public’s access to a copyrighted work consists the principal interest affected by a 
copyright holder’s exclusivity, copyright -as property right- is not the raison d'être of 
such an outcome but the solution provided in this implied controversy. Hence, property 
regime and its intrinsic values as espoused by copyright law, should not constitute a 
target state of coercion; in effect, they represent a conscious choice among the options 
offered by the law, enshrined into the copyright regime, adjusted -as a tailor-made 
modification- to its objectives and “used” as the operational tool through which a 
“careful balance” between the principles of exclusivity and access will be eventually 
achieved. As a result, the proprietary nature of copyright operates complementary to 
(and not against) the fulfillment of the purpose of the law, under which the rights of the 
authors will be effectively afforded, safeguarded and -when necessary- enforced, while 
simultaneously the “multiplicity, the independence and the survival of the 
communication” in a democratic society will be supported and guaranteed.16  
1.2 Idea/Expression Dichotomy as an Arrow in the Quiver or a Shield? 
 
Conniving at the origins and physiognomy of copyright as a balance - seeking policy, this 
assertion against the establishment of copyright system on a property basis has also 
employed the demand for the free circulation of ideas as the grounds on which such a 
rejection could be justified. Under this argumentation, the exclusivity privilege afforded 
to a copyright holder is inadmissible, based on the manifestation that an idea cannot be 
stolen17, thus consisting the raw material of following creations, information and spread 
of knowledge in general, and forming, as such, the pillar of democratic speech. And 
indeed, it is. And this is exactly the reason why copyright does not protect ideas but only 
expressions and not any expression but only to the extent it is original. It is the 
fundamental principle of idea/expression dichotomy, further aligned with originality 
doctrine, that consists one of the most (if not the most) significant flexibilities that 
copyright protection offers as to where to draw the necessary, decisive and pivotal line.  
 
                                                 
16 Ibid, pp. 167 - 168 
17 See n. 11, p. 15 
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In other words, this essential division between an unprotected (by copyright) idea and 
its protectable expression is exactly a policy (in itself), adopted in order to achieve an 
effective balance, under which copyright -as property right- confers upon the author of 
an original expression of an abstract and free exchangeable idea, the right to be 
rewarded for his intellectual contribution. 
1.2.1 The “Body” and the “Soul” of a Work: Fixing the Boundaries  
 
Consisting either a “minimum” quid pro quo under the common - law perception of 
copyright as a creation of statute, or the right to the absolute exploitation of the whole 
economic value of a work under the property theory18 -enveloping, as such, copyright 
with the mantle of human rights’ protection19-, the operative event of the “author’s 
reward” remains, in both cases, the “birthing” of a creative outcome, defined as the 
expression of an intellectual creation20, which shall be originated with the author. Here, 
a clear distinction needs to be made, as unambiguously determined in both theoretical 
and judicial contours. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Selsky, Eileen L. “Is Copyright a Property Right or a Creation of Statute”, Entertainment and Sports Law 
Journal, Volume 2, 1984 
19 As the right to property consists a fundamental human right -aligned with the “dignity and worth of the 
human person"-, established by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides, in article 
17, that “everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others”. The 1952 
Protocol to the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
has further specified the right to property as the “peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions”, while 
dictating that “no one shall be deprived” of his property “except in the public interest” (article 1); this 
fundamental declaration has been respectively adopted in the Greek Constitution (article 17).  
In this sense, it could be argued that this “limitation” to the human right to property for the sake of public 
interest- as established by the milestones documents in both international, regional and national level-, 
has been pro rata enshrined in copyright law, where the absolute and exclusive right of the author is 
respectively narrowed under the same purpose; this foundational objective is further pursued and 
achieved, inter alia, through the division between an idea and its expression. 
20 The definition of the protectable subject – matter of copyright protection as the “author’s own 
intellectual creation” has been introduced as an institutional directive criterion (throughout the European 
community) with regard to photographs, software and databases (2006/116/EC Directive on the term of 
protection of copyright and certain related rights, 2009/24/EC Directive on the legal protection of 
computer programs and 96/9/ Directive on the legal protection of databases). The Court of Justice of the 
European Union has later elaborated both on the notion per se and its scope of application, declaring that 
it uniformly and autonomously applies to all types and every single work. 
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Copyright protection applies on the creation of a work, and not to the physical 
carrier that “contains” this creation, as copyright does not protect a work as an 
“external object in and of itself” but as “the embodiment of the author's interiority or 
personality”, externalized and manifested as “oeuvre” 21. It is exactly this clear and 
functional separation between the materiality and the essence of a work that, beyond 
implementing a required and appropriate division between copyright and property law 
(as concentrated on differentiated subject - matters), it principally demonstrates the 
core of copyright protection; starting from the premise that copyright does not bind 
“every aspect of an author’s work”, and if a work is segregated between its corporality 
and “psyche”22 -or the medium and the spirit “captured” within it-, copyright does not 
protect a work as a thing but as an expression.23 Consequently, the substance of this link 
and its protection by copyright as the author’s right to an original expression, 
demonstrate the consolidation of both originality as the “sine qua non” of copyright24 
and “idea/expression” dichotomy as its very essence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Drassinower, Abraham, “A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law”, 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. XVI, No.l, 2003, p. 13  
22 As one may implement, in copyright law, the “theory of the soul” under its philosophical analysis; in this 
sense, “phsyche” existed before and will survive the body within which it had been only temporarily living, 
transfusing it, though, its immortality as “grasped by the Mind”. Indeed, “psyche”, as dominantly 
governing the body during their “symbiosis”, is present and active in “all cognitive operations”, leading, as 
such, to its reconsideration as the principal feature through which a “man’s or woman’s personality” will 
be eventually characterized. Solmsen, Friedrich, “Plato and the Concept of the Soul (Psyche): Some 
Historical Perspectives”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 44, No.3, 1983  
23 See n. 20 
24 As “copyright protection applies only in relation to a subject – matter which is original, in the sense that 
it is the author’s intellectual creation”, thus the embodiment of his creativity and the reflection of his 
personality as originally expressed. Under this context, the author shall exercise creative freedom -by 
making free and creative choices- in the production (i.e. creation) of a work, stamping as such the creative 
outcome with his “personal touch”. Consisting a qualitative and not a quantitative assessment, where 
varying levels of protection are also inadmissible, originality -as uniformly and autonomously construed 
throughout the European community-, consists the “sole criterion for copyright protection”. Stamatoudi, 
Irini, “Originality under EU Copyright Law”, in “Research Handbook on Copyright Law: Second Edition”, 
Paul Torremans (Ed), Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK) - Northampton (US), 2017, pp. 57 - 84 
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As a result, the property – rights’ “infusion” in copyright law does not solely or merely 
imply a “monopoly privilege” to its holder (under the oversimplification formulated by 
its abolitionists), but it is the legal recognition of the “substantive relationship between 
a person and a thing” under its classical identification as the right to use, acquire or 
dispose of (any) property25. Correspondingly, the incorporeal and even deeper and 
stronger personal bond that inextricably aligns a creator with his intellectual creations 
as an inherent and “parental” nexus, should be indisputably “honored” with an 
equivalent (to property) protection system under copyright law.  
 
In its traditional conception, as a corporeal control over tangible objects, it 
involves the right to physically exclude non-owners from the owner’s property. In its 
intangible transubstantiation, it is the right of the copyright owner to control and not to 
lose the ability to control his own intellectual property26, actualized by the “bundle” of 
absolute and exclusive rights that the author -as the initial rightholder- deserves on his 
copyrights; it is the rule of the author’s prior authorization and the right -in its economic 
transfiguration- to derive financial reward from the use of copyrighted works by third-
parties27. However, there is no exclusionary rule without an impeachment exception; 
and in the field of copyright, the rule is not only tested but is, in effect, recrafted by its 
exception... 
                                                 
25 See n. 7, pp. 37-38, 40. 
26 In terms of copyright, this intangible property is defined as an intellectual creation, a product of the 
mind that supersedes the boundaries of a common idea, crafted independently from its author and 
transmuted to a particular expression that bears his individuality, fulfilling as such the originality 
prerequisite. Furthermore, the norm of expression implies by nature an externalization process, 
conceived as the way that is communicated to the public through a specific order, selection and 
arrangement. Stanton, Laurence A., “Expression and Originality in Copyright Law”, Washburn Law Journal, 
Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1972, pp. 401 – 402. One could argue that this interpretation constitutes an alternative 
implementation (or the origins) of the communication to the public right (as one of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights over his works), while the specificity requirements, namely the distinct order and 
arrangement as an expression’s component elements, resemble to the definition adopted towards the 
copyrightability of databases as provided in article 3 of the 96/9/EC Directive on the legal protection of 
databases. The same requirement of “revelation” is also adopted in Greek copyright law, under which a 
work has to be manifested (namely communicated to the public) in any way, taking the form of “either an 
embodiment in or on some solid material” or consisting “an act that only momentarily makes the work 
accessible to the senses, especially to human sight or hearing”. Stamatoudi, Irini and Koumantos, George, 
“Greek Copyright Law”, P. Sakkoulas Editions, Athens, 2014, pp. 21 - 22 
27 Consisting the statutory expression of “economic rights” as the one type of rights conferred upon to the 
copyright owner by copyright; in parallel, copyright protects the author’s moral rights over his intellectual 
creations (in varying degrees between the common law and civil law copyright traditions). 
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1.3 Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright: Reconstruction by Restriction 
 
In effect, copyright is all about restricted acts, namely potential uses of a copyrighted 
material that fall under the rightholder’s prudential acquiescence and consent, as the 
means through which he will be effectively rewarded28 for his intellectual creations. 
Simultaneously, though, it is also copyright per se that is (self)limited due to the 
prevailing nature and overriding character of public interest, forming, as such, the 
legitimate grounds for the justification of the thresholds imposed29 on the exercise of 
the author’s rights (as -intellectual- property rights).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 The author’s reward has been considered as to be motivated under two differentiated conceptions that 
signify the diverging policies adopted in the common law and civil law traditions on copyright; according 
to the “utilitarian” perceptive, it consists a ““kinitron” for the production of creative works for the benefit 
of society”, thus converting copyright into an “opt-in system” under which authorization for the further 
exploitation of a work will be affirmatively provided; in contrast, its “romantic” interpretation aligns the 
recognition of the author’s reward with the principle of creativity per se, considering it as an expressive 
dimension of authorship. Torremans, Paul, “Exceptions and Limitations in the Digital Era”, in “Copyright 
and the Digital Agenda for Europe: Current Regulations and Challenges for the Future”: See n.17 
29 The interrelationship and alleged overlapping between the rights of the author and those defined by 
the norm of “public interest” constitute -especially under the common law perception of copyright- an 
intertemporal debate on where this limit should be fixed. According to this view, the exclusivity afforded 
to copyright holders constitutes the “unfettered ability to exclude others from using the copyrighted 
work, no matter the social utility of the use”, allegedly circumventing the social goal of encouraging 
creativity -especially in the light of online environment-, while even disputing the competency of the law -
described as “static legal rules”- to address the current needs and demands of society with respect to the 
dynamic technological innovations. Patry, William, “Limitations and Exceptions in the Digital Era”, Indian 
Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 2001, pp. 2-7. Moreover, with regard to artistic creations, it 
has been contented that a “portion of all copyright activity is derivative”, while appropriation is 
exclusively (and rather paradoxically) perceived as increasing the “flow of new creations”; in this context, 
even the incentive provided by copyright law for creating further, consists an implicit “obligation” to share 
this creation with the public, while the later is considered as unreasonably weighed by the “heavy 
burden” to prove a non-infringement. Ruiz, Nicholas, “Copyright's Paradox: The Public Interest and Private 
Monopoly”, Intellectual Property Law Bulletin, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 212 – 215. However, these 
approaches disregard both the self-limited character of the legal monopoly granted to the author, as well 
as the role of exceptions in limitations as a policy-making decision towards the achievement of an 
effective equilibrium between the author and the public. Moreover, the manifestation of a work or an 
intellectual creation -as an act of companionship and sociability- constitutes, either way, the sine qua non 
of copyright protection, while comprising -in the field of arts- a self-evident quality of an artistic creation 
as there is no art without the public. Thus, inspiration per se and the opportunity to build upon previous 
works is starkly recognized by copyright law, especially through the exclusion of ideas from the scope of 
protection. 
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Consisting the key rationale behind the fundamental concept of “exceptions and 
limitations” that forms, in turn, a “central element of copyright policy equation”30, while 
inherently linked with the history and substance of copyright law per se as its main 
objective, the principle of public interest is neither the reasoning for the recognition 
(and establishment) of the protection granted to the author by the law, nor the dialectic 
for the exclusion of specific subject - matters from his entitlement over his intellectual 
creations; it is both, as in the case of copyright, public good and the claims of individuals 
are essentially indissociable -or at least, compatible-, while the interests of the authors 
(and rightholders in general) fully coincide with those of the public.31  
 
However, this philosophical train of thought is sharply barreled down the railway 
tracks, if recalling and reconsidering the conception and structure of copyright law. If 
copyright “has always sought to reflect a balance between protection and access” -even 
since its earliest stages and initial formulation-, while being, in parallel, vibrated by its 
circling -as a perpetual- interconnection with human rights, then the equilibrium to be 
reached presupposes, entails and depends on a conflict between competing rights, 
interests and subsequent claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Gervais, Daniel, “Fair Use, Fair Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts to Conceptualize Exceptions and 
Limitations to Copyright”, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Vol. 57, Issue 3, 2010, p. 500 
31 As they both share -in its very essence- a common objective, the (further) production of creative 
content. Encompassed by copyright law under the notion of “encouraging creativity” -as the two words 
incorporating its own aim and scope-, the means through which this goal will be achieved forms 
concurrently the “heart” of the balance sought by copyright law, and the core of the dispute between the 
interested parties, since adopting a completely differentiated approach. In one hand, authors are entitled 
to control the further exploitation of their works (including dissemination as the “heart” of the 
communication to the public right), while, on the other hand, public seeks wider dissemination of 
copyrighted materials, on the basis of the right to access. Peters, Marybeth, “Copyright Enters the Public 
Domain”, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Vol. 51, Issue 4, 2004, pp. 703 - 70 
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Indeed, the stakes involved are extraordinarily high if considering that they form 
a labyrinthine system of battles and controversies between, on the one hand, the right 
to (intangible) property, to subsequently control and exclude, and the right not be 
copied32, and on the other hand, the right to access (and use) as a dimension of the right 
to information and participation in cultural life, the freedom of expression and the right 
to privacy33, along with the interference of competition law.34 Hence, the inquiry of an 
effective balance between the creator and society at large, or -in explicit terms- the 
copyright owners and copyright users, comes profoundly at copyright law’s “most basic 
levels”.35  
 
 
                                                 
32 Following the proposition that “original”, in terms of copyright and as rigidly interconnected with the 
norm of expression, does not mean novel but “simply not to be copied from another work” -under the 
United States copyright law. Drassinower, Abraham, “What's Wrong with Copying?”, Harvard University 
Press, 2015 
33 Operating as fundamental rights established “either under international human rights law or as 
constitutional rights on the national level”, human rights, and for most, freedom of expression constitutes 
an extrinsic factor -since falling outside the normative sphere of copyright-, but still a direct and 
compressive force towards the identification and redetermination -by potential limitation- of copyright’s 
subject – matter and scope of application. Gervais, Daniel J., “Making Copyright Whole: A Principled 
Approach to Copyright Exceptions and Limitations”, University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, Vol. 
5, 2008 
34 Based on the doctrine of the prohibition of the abuse of (any) right, the conflicts arising between 
copyright and competition law allegedly derive by virtue of the copyright owner’s exclusivity over its 
copyrighted expressions and the contented “misuse” of copyright -in cases of licensing (or refusing to 
license) a copyrighted material-, since allegedly “destroying” or at least, “restricting” the marketplace of 
the expression’s underlying ideas. Cross, John T. and Yu, Peter K., “Competition Law and Copyright 
Misuse”, Drake Law Review, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 433 – 437. However, the Court of Justice of 
European Union has stated that the exercise -by an owner of intellectual property rights- of his exclusive 
rights, and in particular, a refusal to grant a license to third – parties “cannot in itself constitute an abuse 
of a dominant position”, since an obligation to the contrary would “lead the proprietor to be deprived of 
the substance of his exclusive right”, C 238/87 Volvo v. Veng [1988], judgment of 5th October 1988, ECR 
6211. Moreover, this conflict between the exclusivity of rights and free competition is only one aspect of 
the interface between the two fields of the law, as inherently operating complementary to each other; in 
this sense, if the remuneration provided by the exclusive rights conferred upon the author is not 
produced by exclusivity per se, but it is clearly depending on the “customers’ willingness to pay”, then it is 
the “proactive” role of competition law that actually produces such a reward by “creating and maintaining 
efficient distribution channels and copyright-related markets”, while eradicating, as such, unauthorized 
uses and illegal copies. Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, “Copyright, 
Competition and Development”, Munich, 2013, pp. 4 – 6 
35 It is through the identification of the “coverage” that the monopolistic set of rights confers upon a 
copyright holder, namely the determination of the boundaries of an eligible -for copyright protection- 
subject- matter, that the “costs” imposed on the society will be simultaneously “reversed” by a common 
benefit, realized through the “plentiful supply and wide dissemination” of intellectual creations. Abrams, 
Howard B., “Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 55, Issue 
2, 1992, pp. 3-5.  
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Therefore, it could be argued that the concept of exceptions and limitations on the 
author’s economic rights36 , and in particular, its formulation, evolution and subsistence 
per se have been deeply affected37 by the effective conflicts between the competing 
rights and opposing interests of copyright holders and the public38, as being always 
oscillated -due, inter alia, to their dynamic nature- between attraction and repulsion, 
between trust and suspicion. 
                                                 
36 Under which, neither a prior authorization, nor the payment of the relevant remuneration are required. 
37 In this context, the doctrine of exceptions and limitations has been treated rather reluctantly in the 
institutional level, thus mostly providing for optional exceptions and limitations -leading as such to 
inconsistency or legal uncertainty- under specific, though, requirements. Thus, 1886 Berne Convention 
provides for “possible” exceptions to the right of reproduction (article 9), declaring that “it shall be a 
matter for legislation in the countries of the Union” to permit the reproduction of literary and artistic 
works under three, though, prerequisites: i) in certain special cases, which ii) do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and iii) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author (the 
“three – step test”), while also providing (in article 10) for certain free uses of works, where only the 
quotations exception is dictated as mandatory (under the “shall be permissible” wording). The same 
requirements for the confinement of exclusive rights, as afforded (again) by its members, has been 
adopted in the TRIPs Agreement (article 13), considered as the actual implementation of the “three-step 
test” in the international level, while a similar impact has been attributed to “Infosoc Directive” which 
introduced the “three-step test” (as such) in the European level (article 5§5). Although it has been 
construed as a “filter” towards the legitimacy of the potential use of any copyrighted work, the test has 
been explicitly provided in relation to software (under the 2009/24/EC Directive on the legal protection of 
computer programs (article 6§3)), under the 2006/115/EC Directive on rental right and lending right and 
on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (article 10§3) and towards 
databases (under the 96/9/EC Directive on the legal protection of databases (article 8§2)). However, the 
wording and the scope of “Infosoc Directive” have been regarded as the “most significant” expansion of 
the role of the “three-step test”, as exhaustively specifying the cases and uses where such an exception 
could be adopted by member – states. In addition, “Infosoc Directive” has further illustrated the scope of 
exceptions and limitations under EU Copyright law as serving the public interest (providing for the general 
framework of educational and teaching purposes), while also imposing the principle of “fair balance” of 
rights and interests between the different categories of rightholders (copyright and related rights 
holders), as well as between rightholders and users. Although stating that there should be a reassessment 
of the concept of exceptions and limitations as the existing differences and diverging implementations in 
the national law “have direct negative effects on the functioning of the internal market of copyright and 
related rights”, while also duly reflecting their “increased economic impact” especially in the light of the 
“new electronic environment”, the desired harmonization has been argued to have failed under this 
legislative initiative, while a limitation on the limitations (i.e. a restrictive rather than a liberal 
interpretation) has been only provided as a suggestion with respect to the digital era (recitals 14, 31 and 
44). In the national level, Greek copyright law, as one of the most comprehensive -and favorable to the 
authors- copyright systems, has included the “three -step test” as a clause for the general application of 
limitations under article 28C. 
38 As the two more significant developments of the last decades -the technical in nature and the evolution 
of legal policies- have altered the triangular relationship (and subsequent balance sought) between the 
“three protagonists in the field of copyright”, namely the authors, the related right holders and the public, 
shifting now the interest (and consequently the relevant debate) on the “public’s claim for a free access to 
information which would allegedly justify more exceptions to copyright”. Lucas-Schloetter, Agnès, “Is 
There a Concept of European Law? History, Evolution, Policies and Politics and the Acquis 
Communautaire”, in “EU Copyright Law: A Commentary”, See n.1, pp. 15 - 16 
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1.3.1. Right to Access and Freedom of Expression: Limiting or Limited? 
In our days, the eventful fate of the right to access and the right to exclusivity -as its 
denial-, constitute the two pillars of copyright strategy that have been dramatically 
affected by the vast explosion, the rapid maturation and concurrent “resurrection” of 
the digital (r)evolution, due to the uncounted possibilities offered or the threats 
endangered. Furthermore, this new reality has challenged the character of copyright per 
se, along with its underlying policies39, which had to be reinvented (or at least, 
modernized) in order to “stay fit for purpose in the digital context”40. As digitalization 
and the development of technology lie “at the heart” of the current debate between the 
proponents of a wider and more intense protection scheme afforded to copyright 
owners (even including private and personal uses), and the “advocates of the public 
domain”41 who seek the implementation of a pro bono or (at least) cost – reduction 
strategy towards the use of protected copyright resources, the balance between the 
various stakeholders’ interests undoubtedly “needs to be recalibrated”42. 
                                                 
39 In this sense, the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on the Intellectual Property System 
has launched seven Digital Copyright Principles “intended to serve as a framework for policymakers, 
copyright owners, and content consumers to ensure that the value of intellectual property embodied in 
creative content continues to be appropriately recognized”: online available at: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC_Cop yrightPrinciples.pdf, as accessed in November 2017. 
40 In the European level, the focus is shifted on the facilitation of the cross-border access to online content 
by increasing its availability and subsequent choice-making (establishing -in this context- a mandatory 
exception for the benefit of blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled persons), on the creation 
of a fairer digital marketplace by enforcing the rightholders to negotiate and be remunerated for the 
online exploitation of their works, on the digital preservation of cultural heritage and wider use of cultural 
material, and on the reassessment of the (yet) optional exceptions under EU law in order to be 
appropriately adapted in “today’s technological realities”: “Modernization of the EU copyright rules”, 
online available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/modernisation-eu-copyright-
rules#marketplace. See also “Copyright for Creativity: A Declaration for Europe”, online available at: 
http://copyright4creativity.eu/declaration-english-version/, as accessed in November 2017. In this regard, 
it has been argued that the new “Digital Copyright Law” should be comprehensively reviewed and even 
thoroughly revised, as a pro rata application of copyright’s traditional rules in the digital context may not 
satisfy the objectives pursued; thus, a new “much more simplified” copyright system has been suggested, 
where even the “bundle” of rights conferred upon a copyright holder would be replaced by the single 
right to “control the dissemination of exploitation” of a copyrighted work, since the alleged neutrality of 
such a right is considered as an effective -and unaffected by digitization- response to the constantly 
emerging challenges. In addition, the introduction of an International Copyright Code has been proposed 
as a solution to the problems arising by the inconsistency in copyright national laws and traditions 
(operating as a barrier to an effective copyright protection especially in the digital environment), while the 
so-called “copyleft” movement proclaims the construction of licensing models, under which the 
“collaborative and open” exploitation of digital works will be allowed. Stokes, Simon, “Digital Copyright: 
Law and Practice”, 4th edition, Hart Publishing, 2014.  
41 Griffiths, Jonathan, “The “'Three-Step Test” in European Copyright Law - Problems and Solutions”, 
Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 31/2009, p.1 
42 http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations/, as accessed in November 2017. 
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It is true that the interface between copyright and digital technology did not (and does 
not) merely constitute a fertile soil in which a constructive dialogue could grow and bear 
fruit, providing, as such, consensual solutions to the new conflicts arising. Instead, it has 
formed an “increasingly heated and polarized debate” over the scope and the edges of 
copyright protection; on the one side, copyright is considered as “too broad” or even 
“unnecessary” in specific applications (the so-called copyright’s “overexpansion” or 
“overprotection” argument). On the other side, copyright claims encompass the concern 
of the current framework’s insufficiency to provide both effective protection and right 
incentives for the creation of new works”.43  
 
How, though, are new works created? It is indisputable that any intellectual 
creation -even the most radically original- depends upon the “cultural heritage” or 
“cultural tradition”, thus accessing, leveraging and inevitably including spiritual 
elements implied by intellectual life and history.44  
                                                 
43 It is under the functionalistic approach of law and economics to copyright, perceived as the “means to 
an end” and not as an inherent right, that the current controversy is not merely focused on the 
-necessary- reconsideration and revision of traditional copyright rules in the light of the digital era, but 
also includes the battleground between the “nonexclusive” nature of information (and ideas) as a “public 
good”. Neglecting that facts are ideas are, in any case, excluded from the scope of copyright protection, 
this argumentation provides that they are, moreover, not rivalrous in the sense that “one person’s use 
does not affect the value of any other person’s use”, and, as such, the authors’ exclusive rights, since 
merely considered as the means to “recover the fixed costs of creation” or to “appropriate the benefits of 
investment in the production of information products”. Sag, Matthew J., “Beyond Abstraction: The Law 
and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency”, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 81, Issue 1, 2006, 
pp. 188 - 196   
44 At this point, a purely artistic dialectic may interfere; it has been argued that there is nothing 100% 
original, since the entirety of a creative process is built upon what already existed; as any artist realizes 
that nothing comes from nowhere, he starts (or should start) “copying” in order to realize what makes 
him different, to magnify it, to give it a form, and through this process, to eventually, become who he 
actually is [mine translation]. Kleon, Austin, “Steal Like an Artist: 10 Things Nobody Told You About Being 
Creative”, Key Books, 2013, pp. 15 – 51. It is what Pablo Picasso said: “Good artists copy, great artists 
steal”. Even though in its aesthetic conceptualization, “copying” is considered as an automatic, 
mechanical interaction with the original, a mere imitation which implies no (critical) thinking. In the 
contrary, “stealing” presupposes a conscious choice of what Austin Kleon describes as “worthy stealing”, 
simply operating as a sparkle of inspiration, a daring of imagination, or as an exercise for someone to 
discover and express his own creativity, forming, as such, the grounds for new art to be created. It is what 
T.S. Eliot wrote: “Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good 
poets make it into something better, or at least something different. The good poet welds his theft into a 
whole of feeling which is unique, utterly different from that from which it was torn; the bad poet throws it 
into something which has no cohesion”. Eliot, Thomas, Stearns, “The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and 
Criticism: Main Edition”, Faber & Faber, 1997. Still though, the boundaries between inspiration, 
imagination, imitation, copying, or stealing, are covered in dense fog; similarly, these borderlines -within 
the legal interpretation of art- seem even more difficult to be fixed, and idea/expression dichotomy 
illustrates exactly this tension, under a substantially different, though, appreciation.  
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In this sense, if copyright -as an exclusive right- provided the rightholder with the 
authority to govern and bind the components of a work in their entirety, excluding, as 
such, their “exploitation” by other means -meaning their integration into new works 
with differentiated intellectual or aesthetic content-, then this monopoly would end up 
imposing a restriction to the continuity of any intellectual creation, crossing, in parallel, 
the threshold of freedom of expression as profoundly implicated. However, this 
ascertainment illustrated the need to rebuff the consideration of a work as a cohesive 
and indivisible state of aggregation, and instead, to dichotomize it between its 
copyrightable elements and those which shall be excluded from copyright protection; in 
other words, the expression versus the idea dichotomy.  
 
Since an intellectual creation is dimidiated between the (form of) expression45 as 
the subject - matter of copyright protection, and the underlying idea as the liberalized  
-from the author’s exclusivity- content, and provided that freedom of expression -as 
enshrined in international and regional human rights instruments46- includes and 
presupposes the right to access, determined, though, as receiving and imparting 
“information and ideas”, it is profound that the subject-matter of freedom of expression 
falls outside the scope of copyright protection. 
 
 
                                                 
45 It has been said that the theory of idea/expression dichotomy had -soon after its realization-  faced its 
first difficulty, as inherently interrelated with the norm of “exceptions” and its effects to copyright; strictly 
speaking, if it was merely the form of a work that would be eligible for copyright protection, then a 
number of uses that are widely (both under the law and according to the common perception) realized as 
copyright infringements, should be reconsidered as “exceptions” to copyright. These exceptions, though, 
would be so significant -both in quantitative and qualitative terms- that they would eventually “dissolve” 
the general rule per se. As a result, the notion of “form” (coincided with the terminology of the Greek 
work “morphy”, leading, as such, to the implementation of the dichotomy under the Greek law as the 
distinction between the “morphy” of a work and the “idea”), as conceptually coincided with expression, 
has been broadened and dichotomized ex novo between its extrinsic and intrinsic substance; the first one 
corresponds to the external features of a work as commonly perceived (i.e. the wording, the melody, the 
instrumentation, the pattern, the colors combination, the dimensions etc.), while the intrinsic form 
includes, inter alia, the plot or the story of a work, the sequence of thoughts and images, and the 
melodies’ structure and formulation; since these intrinsic elements will “survive” even after a work’s 
potential translation or adaptation, they constitute the protectable components of a work, and 
concurrently the subject -  matter of potential uses that would infringe an author’s copyright. [mine 
translation] Koumantos, George, “Pneumatiki Idioktisia: 8th Edition”, Sakkoulas Ant. Ν., 2002, pp. 113-115. 
46 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: article 19; European Convention of Human Rights: article 10; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 19§2) 
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As a result, not only copyright law does not interfere with the exercise of human rights, 
and for most, freedom of expression47, but instead, it strikes itself the equilibrium 
demanded, adopting and providing -for this purpose- intrinsic balancing mechanisms, 
where idea/expression dichotomy constitutes the cornerstone of this infrastructure48;  
if the conflicts arising between copyright and freedom of expression are resolved 
through the principle of “fair balance” 49, based exactly upon the division between an 
idea and its expression, the limitations imposed are mutually applicable, and, as such, 
they could be defined as “fair limitations”. 
                                                 
47 However, a differentiated argument has been developed, on the basis of an allegedly “narrow 
understanding” of freedom of expression; in this sense, it has been said that there are not always 
sufficient alternatives -in relation to the use of copyrighted material- in order to “convey exactly the same 
message”, or even if such alternatives exist, a potential infringer may not always be able to discover them; 
in this regard, the use of the copyrightable elements of a work usually operates as the “evidence” for the 
persuasiveness of free speech, and as a result, the qualification of idea/expression dichotomy as an 
effective means to prevent copyright from impinging on freedom of expression is “problematic”, 
“erroneous”, or at least, “unpersuasive”. Burell, Robert and Coleman Allison, “Copyright Exceptions: The 
Digital Impact”, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 21-24. However, such an argument is contradictory, 
inter alia, to the judicial determination -under U.S. case-law- of the dichotomy as already serving to 
accommodate the competing interests of copyright and freedom of expression (in Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), leading, as such, to the 
conclusion that “because copyright protects only the expression of an idea and not the idea itself, there is 
no conflict between copyright laws and the First Amendment” (See n.51). Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 
426 (D.D.C. 1979.  
48 Thus, operating along with the “fair use” doctrine (under the United States copyright system) as the 
principal tools in order to achieve one of the most crucial balances in the field of copyright law, since it 
has been considered as prima facie competitive and confrontational with the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, under which the freedom of expression has been established (providing that 
“Congress shall make no law (...) abridging the freedom of speech”) [mine translation]. Athanasopoulos, 
Evangelos Sp., ““The Idea/Expression Dichotomy”: A comparative study of the "idea/expression 
dichotomy" under the U.S. Copyright Act and the N. 2121/1993”, Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2017, pp. 15 – 19. 
Moreover, Professor Nimmer has regurgitated idea/expression dichotomy as the borderline between 
copyright and the guarantee of freedom of speech, thus introducing the famous “definitional balancing 
test”; under this test, “ideas per se fall on the free speech side of the line, while the statement of an idea in 
specific form, as well as the selection and arrangement of ideas fall on the copyright side of the line”. 
Nimmer, Melville B, “Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press”, 
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 17, Issue 6, 1970, p. 1190. Furthermore, the significance and effect of 
idea/expression dichotomy for copyright’s compatibility with free speech interests has been also 
complemented by the identification of copyright as a “public-quasi property”, thus incorporating and 
safeguarding the public interest; in this context, It has been said that if the exercise of freedom of speech -
operating as a defense in copyright infringement claims- is deemed as violating or misappropriating the 
copyright owners’ property rights (rather than conflicting with copyright’s conduct per se), then the 
balance required may be more easily achieved and the conflicts arising may be more appropriately 
resolved. See n. 6, pp. 386, 389 – 391, 396, 401 
49 A conflict emerging, inter alia, in the key-issue of the right to parody under EU Copyright Law, as 
explicitly provided under the so-called “parody exception” under the “Infosoc Directive” (article 5(3)(k)), 
and fundamentally identified as an “appropriate way to express an opinion” in accordance with specific, 
though, requirements, under the landmark ruling of the Court of Justice of European Union in Case C-
201/13 Deckmyn v. Vandersteen [2014], judgment of 3 September 2014. 
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1.3.2 The Nature and Underlying Purpose of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
 
Indeed, the objective of “fair balance” does not merely apply to the conflicts arising 
between copyright and freedom of expression50. Since the concept of “exceptions and 
limitations” incorporates the whole philosophy behind and within the “limited nature”51 
of copyright law, thus actualizing its scope and motivation to encourage and safeguard 
the individual rights and interests of the authors, along with the collective “demand” to 
access and use copyrighted works, the relationship formed between the authors, as the 
originators and “providers” of intellectual creations, and the public as the “recipients” 
and beneficiaries of such creations, is governed, in its entirety, by the principle of “fair 
balance” as emphatically outlined by the Court of Justice of European Union52.  
 
                                                 
50 In this sense, it has been argued that copyright, under its three-dimensional purpose to serve 
production functions (as an economic incentive), structural functions (as supporting a sector of authors) 
and expressive functions (as “encouraging new, original contributions to the public discourse”) has a 
constitutive role as an effective “engine of free expression”, when “narrowly” tailored to this purpose, 
namely when minimizing the “copyright’s speech burdens”. Netanel, Neil Weinstock, “Copyright’s 
Paradox”, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 81-153 
51 Theberge v. Galerie d’ art du Petit Champlain, 2002 SCC 34 
52 The concept of “exceptions and limitations” has been regarded by the Court of Justice of European 
Union as falling within the general principle of “strict interpretation”, in full compliance with the letter 
and spirit of the “three-step test” (Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening 
[2009], judgment of 16 July 2009, ECR I-656). Recognizing that the rights of the users of protected works 
who wish to avail themselves of those works (especially in the light of new technologies), constitute the 
subject - matter of “exceptions and limitations” and copyright law per se, the court dictates that they 
should be fairly balanced with the rights of copyright holders (Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 
Football Association Premier League Ltd and Karen Murphy [2011], judgment of 4 October 2011, ECR I-
9083), further imposing -with regard to the reproduction right- that the exception to the author’s 
exclusive right “must be the subject of a restrictive interpretation under which such an exception cannot 
be extended beyond what is expressly imposed by the provision at issue” (Case 277/10 Martin Luksan v. 
Petrus van der Let [2012], judgment of 9 February 2012, ECDR 5). It should be noted that this “unification 
process” has been characterized as initiating the current debate and controversy on the concept of 
“exceptions and limitations”, since “forcing” member - states to amend their copyright legislations; 
however, this point of view circumvents the aim of harmonization as manifested in any legislative 
instrument in the EU level, thus signified as the means through which the objectives of European Union 
per se will be achieved. In this sense, the Court of Justice, through its landmark rulings, has been argued 
to have shifted the center of copyright harmonization throughout the community from the legislative to 
the judicial competency, forming as such “an activist agenda of harmonization by interpretation”. 
Hugenholtz, P. Bernt, “Copyright in Europe: Twenty Years Ago, Today and What the Future Holds”, 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 513 - 516. 
And this contribution to legal certainty which, in turn, regularizes and normalizes the function of the 
internal market for new products and services -as promoted and protected by copyright law-, “in 
compliance with the fundamental principles of law and especially of property, including intellectual 
property, freedom of expression and the public interest” (Preamble of the “Infosoc Directive”), is nothing 
less than profoundly significant. 
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Since the principle of “fair balance” constitutes the epitome of the solution 
provided in any conflict emerging between the opposing rights and interests in the field 
of copyright law, it necessarily determines the outcome of the intertemporal 
controversy between “idea” and “expression”, and for most, the critical decision as to 
where shall the line be drawn. If further considering that “any copyright case is a case 
about the equality of the litigants as authors”, idea/expression dichotomy operates as 
its principal affirmation since identifying simultaneously the edges of the plaintiff’s 
copyright over his work, while permitting the defendant to “avail himself of ideas”53 as 
an exercise of his own “expressive capacities” through which he will eventually 
construct his own authorship over the new work created; as a result, if the relationship 
between the author, the work and the public (emphasizing on the capacity and eligibility 
of a potential user as an author) is based on the fundamental conditions of freedom and 
equality, then their interaction -as governed by the idea/expression dichotomy- shall be 
defined as a “fair interaction”54. Hence, idea/expression dichotomy inherently 
incorporates the same concerns and motivations that shape, influence and inevitably 
determine the role and substance of exceptions and limitations to copyright as enclosed 
in the principle of “public interest”55; and this is the reason why it constitutes the 
principal realization and fundamental implementation of such exceptions and 
limitations, thus limiting copyright by exempting ideas from the scope of copyright 
protection.  
 
                                                 
53 With regard to artistic creations, it has been said that copyright “does not prevent one from doing what 
creative people what always have done -to stand on the shoulders of giants”, since it seems fair to follow 
and modify the ideas -not to merely copy them- as set forth by “writers, artists, thinkers or researchers”. 
It is this fairness that copyright law -through the distinction between the idea and its expression- aims to 
preserve, by protecting only the specific form of a work, namely “the specific sequence of words with 
which the (capable of being stolen) idea was first presented”. Tamn, Ditlev, “Art and Copy – A Legal 
Historian’s Reflection on Copyright”, in “Art and Law: The Copyright Debate”, Rosenmeier, Morten and 
Teilmann, Stina (Eds.), DJØF Publishing, 2005, pp. 159-160 
54 Drassinower, Abraham, “Capturing Ideas: Copyright and the Law of First Possession”, Cleveland State 
Law Review, Volume 54, Issue 191, 2006, pp. 197-198 
55 Construed as calling itself for “adequate encouragement and protection” of the creators -as the 
“disseminators of materials”-, as a reward for  their assistance or contribution to achieve the goals 
pursued by copyright law; simultaneously, though, “public interest exceptions” to copyright “should not 
be reduced or put at risk in the absence of a cogent case to the contrary”, since the consideration of 
public interest (in a broader sense), shall not be subordinated. Mason, Anthony, “Public-Interest 
Objectives and the Law of Copyright”, Journal of Law and Information Science, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 1998, pp. 8-
9 
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II. IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
2.1 Idea and Expression: Deepening in the Two Sides of the Line 
 
If in the state of nature, public domain means what is common to all men, identified as 
the right to common use “inasmuch is enough and as good left for others”, the right to 
self-preservation -by the maintenance of goods in the commons- is only limited by the 
same claim-right as exercised by everyone else.56 Although there is not “inasmuch” in 
ideas, they analogously fall within the realm of “res communes”, as they can be neither 
owned, nor (re)possessed or occupied by anyone, since, inter alia,  any acquisition as 
property on ideas -as previously unowned “holdings”- would contradict the inherent 
dictum that such a claim shall never be made to “worsen the situation of others by 
depriving them of what they would otherwise possess”57. 
Indeed, if ideas, conceptions, knowledge and verified truths, as the “noblest of 
human productions58, are the “common denominator for the progress of mankind”59, 
and if creativity (or freedom of expression) per se is rooted in those “ideal forms”, then 
it is self- evident that they belong (even if considered as some kind of “property”) to 
“common property”, in order to be freely used by anyone, just like the fresh air, the 
running water and the sea.60 It is this abstract, invisible and transcendent nature of ideal 
forms, as distinguished from the “immanent, visible and concrete” phenomenal 
creatures, through which philosophy segues into law; if the phenomenal derives from 
the ideal as its “primary cause”61, expression is the perceived and detailed form that 
derives from an abstract and indefinite idea.  
                                                 
56 Reaffirming, as such, the qualification of “public domain” as the domain of “fair interaction”. Pontes, 
Leonardo Machado, “Reconciling Lockean Copyright with the Human Right to Education”, in “Property 
and Human Rights in a Global Context” (Human Rights Law in Perspective), Xu, Ting and Allain. Jean (Eds.), 
Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 144 
57 Wengraf, Andrew, “Property in Ideas”, Legal Studies Forum, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 1989, p. 344 
58 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211, 1918 U.S. 
59 Horwitz, Lester, “Copyright Law - Rights in Ideas”, University of Kansas City Law Review, Vol. 24, Issue 4, 
1955-1956, p. 263 
60 Rosati, Eleonora, “Illusions Perdues: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy at Crossroads”, Annual Conference 
of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI), Berkeley (CA), 2009, pp. 2 - 8  
61 Demos, Raphael, “Note on Plato's Theory of Ideas”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, 
No. 3, 1948, p. 456 
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It is what Vincent van Gogh wrote to his beloved brother in 1882: “It seems to me that a 
painter has a duty to try to put an idea into his work”; if lapsing into the conventional, a 
creator does not even go that far than creating a work without any particular 
expression. If, on the contrary, he leaves an “indelible mark”62 on the work created, it 
enables it to be identified. If this mark is, moreover, unique, individual, and, as such, 
original, it permits this work to be protected from being repeated, and  moreover, 
property to be determined; since the ideas’ “unfettered availability to all shall be 
assiduously nurtured”63, the expressive contribution of the author shall be diligently 
safeguarded; and this is the rule, the rationale behind, and the scope of copyright, as 
manifested through idea/expression dichotomy.  
2.2. Expression as Authorship and Ideas as a Claim of Joint Authorship 
 
Determining, as such, the subject - matter of copyright protection, the distinction 
between an idea and its expression simultaneously dictates the status of authorship, 
and consequently, (initial) copyright ownership; since an idea shall be distinguished 
from expression, and it is this author’s expression that is copyright protected to the 
extent it is original (even under its differentiated treatment between common law and 
civil law copyright traditions), it is profound that a component of a work cannot be 
copyright protected if not entailing authorship.64 At the same time, though, the 
contribution of ideas, thoughts and suggestions as a valuable material integrated and 
embedded into a work, consists an argument towards the attribution of joint authorship 
on the basis that such contribution equally “deserves” the protection afforded by 
copyright law. However, copyright does not (and cannot) protect any creative potential 
as inspired or even supplemented to a work by a creative thinker or a purported author. 
The line is drawn as a circle including only the author’s -original- expression, leaving 
ideas (and their contributors) outside its contour. 
                                                 
62 Sherman, Brad and Bently, Lionel, “The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British 
Experience, 1760 – 1911”, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 54 
63 See n.59 
64 Buccafusco, Christopher, “A Theory of Copyright Authorship”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Issue 5, 
2016, p. 1233 
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In works created or argued to have been created jointly, the attribution of authorship 
may display diverging requirements in the diverging copyright traditions65; however, the 
division between a copyrightable expression and an unprotected idea serves as the 
meeting point for such disputes resolutions. For instance, UK jurisprudence has 
repeatedly demonstrated that “there is no copyright in an idea”66; as a result, a person 
who supplies or contributes to the creation of a copyrighted work a number of ideas, 
such as a design for a system that would classify and select the tracks to be played on a 
radio station, “secures no part in copyright”. 67 
In a recent judgment concerning a joint authorship claim over the screenplay of 
the film “Florence Foster Jenkins” -based on the allegedly independent contribution of 
textual inputs to the dialogues of six particular scenes-, the “separate” principle of 
copyright law under which “mere ideas are not protected” has been demonstrated as 
the decisive factor for the resolution of the dispute, dismissing, as such, the relevant 
claim since the inputs were found to be “limited to suggestions of technical musical 
language”.68 Moreover, it has been reaffirmed that a joint author in a literary work must 
do more than contributing ideas to the author, as he “must participate in the writing” -
consisting an author (or co-author) himself-, and “share responsibility” both for the form 
of expression as incorporated in a work, as well as for any relevant decision; as a result, 
neither the thinking of the plot, nor the suggestion for a (comic) routine to be included 
into a work, were found to attract copyrightability or establish joint authorship.69  
 
                                                 
65 For example, under section 10(1) of the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of the United 
Kingdom, “a work of joint authorship means a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors 
in which the contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or authors." Greek 
Copyright Act No. 2121/1993 defines a work of joint authorship as “any work which is the result of the 
direct collaboration of two or more authors”, who share equally, as co-authors, the rights afforded by 
copyright. Moreover, Greek law identifies the terms of “collective works” (as the works “created through 
the independent contribution of several authors acting under the intellectual direction and coordination 
of one natural person”), and “composite works”, as a work composed by separately created parts.  
66  Brighton & Anor v. Jones [2004] EWHC 1157 (Ch) 
67 Tate v. Thomas [1921] 1 Ch 503 
68 The court found that the alleged contributions consisted of musical expressions of a technical nature, 
together with some minor editing changes, along with some non-textual contributions which “never rose 
above the level” of mere ideas. Martin & Anor v. Kogan & Ors [2017] EWHC 2927 (IPEC) 
69 Robin Ray v. Classic FM plc [1998] FSR 622. The widely - cited case has determined that copyright does 
not exist in ideas but in their written expression. 
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2.3 Idea/expression Dichotomy as a Rule of Law 
Following the traditionally hierarchical structure and relationship between the 
international, the regional and the national law, the dichotomy between an idea and its 
expression has been generally perceived as (very) recently established in the 
international level; focusing, however, on the wording of the first legislative instrument 
in the area (the “Berne Convention”), it could be argued that it has been, since 1886, 
adopted, even via an implicit reference. Thus, the first international copyright treaty has 
obliquely declared that a protected -by copyright- (literary and artistic) work is 
inextricably intertwined with the mode or form of its expression70. Nevertheless, it was 
only one hundred years later that the scope -and concurrently the borderlines- of 
copyright protection have been forcefully identified by WIPO Copyright Treaty, as 
(exclusively) applying to “expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of 
operation or mathematical concepts as such”71; a determination which has been further 
correspondingly adopted under the TRIPs Agreement.72  
In the regional level, EU Copyright Law has implemented the international law 
proviso with regard to computer programs, setting out that (copyright) protection shall 
apply to expression in any form, while expressly dictating that “ideas and principles 
which underlie any element of a computer program, including those which underlie its 
interfaces, are not protected by copyright”73.  
 
                                                 
70 “The expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression” (article 2§1), further declaring that 
in addition, “translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic 
work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work (para 3).  
71 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT, article 2), which also declared that computer programs are 
protected as literary works, “whatever may be the form or mode of their expression”. 
72 TRIPs Agreement further stated -with regard to compilations of data or other material-, that such 
compilations, “whether in machine readable or other form, constitute intellectual creations “by reason of 
the selection or arrangement of their contents” and shall be protected as such”; consequently, copyright 
protection “shall not extend to the data or material itself”, implying as such the “symbiosis” of 
idea/expression dichotomy with facts/expression dichotomy (articles 9§2 and 10§2). This provision has 
been implemented, in the EU level, under the 96/9/EC Directive on the legal protection of databases, thus 
attaching copyright protection to the structure -as the contents’ selection and arrangement- of a database 
(consisting, as such, an intellectual creation), and which shall not extend to the contents as such (recitals 
15, 27, 35, article 3§1,2). 
73 Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs (recital 11, article 1§1). 
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2.3.1 Focusing on National Law: The Example of Greece 
 
In the domestic level, the legislative recognition of idea/expression dichotomy has been 
characterized either as a “laconic statement”, or it is rather implicitly provided, or it 
constitutes a judicially formulated principle.74 Greek Copyright Act provides that the 
term ““work” shall designate any original intellectual literary, artistic or scientific 
creation, expressed in any form”75; in this sense, the norm of “intellectual creation” has 
been defined as any “product” of the human spirit that has a form accessible to the 
senses and differs -due to its particularity- to any preexisting creations as to its content 
or form, respectively qualifying photographs76 and humorous designs77 as copyright 
protected works. Moreover, the term “form” in a musical composition has been 
identified as the particular instrumental connection and arrangement of its individual 
elements, consisting, as such, the specific expressive application of the relevant idea 
from which the author’s creation was originated. 78  
 
                                                 
74 With regard to the copyright law of the United Kingdom, it has been said that notwithstanding the fact 
that it does not provide for a statutory basis for idea/expression dichotomy, the doctrine has received 
both “judicial consideration and guided support from time to time in UK law”. Stokes, Simon, “Art and 
Copyright: Second Edition”, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 59 – 65. In this sense, the definition provided by 
Hollinranke v. Truswell, 3 Ch. 420 (1894) has been described as the origins of the terminology later used: 
“Copyright does not extend to ideas, or schemes, or systems, or methods; it is confined to their 
expression; and if their expression is not copied, the copyright is not infringed”, in Rosati, Eleonora, 
“Illusions Perdues: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy at Crossroads” (See n.62, p. 5);  
In Ireland, “idea/expression dichotomy” constitutes a statement under the law, under which “copyright 
protection shall not extend to the ideas and principles which underlie any element of a work, procedures, 
methods of operation or mathematical concepts, and, in respect of original databases, shall not extend to 
their contents and is without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those contents”: 2000 Copyrights and 
Related Rights Act (s.17(3)). Moreover, Czech Republic provides both an affirmative and an illustratively 
negative definition of the subject – matter of copyright protection, thus stating that the items that are not 
works “shall include, but are not limited to the theme (subject) of a work as such, the news of the day and 
any other fact as such, an idea, procedure, principle, method, discovery, scientific theory, mathematical 
and similar formula, statistical diagram and similar item as such”,. Moreover, a “work” is defined as a 
“literary work or any other work of art or a scientific work, which is a unique outcome of the creative 
activity of the author and is expressed in any objectively perceivable manner including electronic form, 
permanent or temporary, irrespective of its scope, purpose or significance”. 2000 Copyright Act: articles 
2(1,6). The same principle of copyright’s neutrality is also provided under French Intellectual Property 
Code, which provides that the authors are entitled over “all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form 
of expression, merit or purpose”, thus implicitly excluding ideas from the scope of copyright protection 
(article L112-1). 
75 Greek Law No.2121/1993 on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters (article 2§1) 
76 Court of Appeals, Athens, Decisions No. 2648/2010  
77 Court of Appeals, Athens, Decision No. 6193/2006 
78 Court of Appeals, Athens, Decision No. 5190/2014 
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Since the distinction between idea and its (form) of expression lays on the manifestation 
that ideas constitute a “common property”, being, as such, free and accessible to 
anyone, while the particular form to which they have been metamorphosed79 belongs 
exclusively to the author, it has been stated that it is only if such a “metamorphosis” 
interferes that this creative outcome is copyright protected, to the extent it is original. 
Introducing, as such, the idea/expression dichotomy in the Greek law, it has been 
emphatically recognized as the substantial rule for the determination of the subject – 
matter of copyright protection, since it constitutes the basic criterion on which the 
protectable elements of a work are distinguished from those that fall outside the scope 
of protection; this distinction is necessary for the reason that works are typically based 
on and leverage previous elements which had either become a common property, or 
they were not qualified as original, or they originated from free sources. 
 In this regard, a monograph on the history of Thessaloniki’s electrification 
incorporating archives, excerpts of scientific works, and relevant press releases, along 
with testimonies, photographs and complementary textual analysis, was qualified as a 
copyrighted work, since the selection and arrangement of the various sources was 
originated with the author80; in addition, an instruction manual for disease prevention 
including material from journalistic investigation was qualified as similarly attracting 
copyright protection since it displayed originality with regard to its form and structure, 
as well as towards the selection and study of its thematic issues. 81 On the contrary, a 
literary work on learning difficulties and dyslexia was found to lack originality (and as 
such, copyrightability), since its content and in particular, its theme and 
conceptualization, along with its indexing and overall expression were found to merely 
rely upon (and repeat) scientific data gathered by the relevant bibliography.82 
                                                 
79 Originating in the Greek verb “metamorphono”, the etymology of the work is comprised by two 
synthetics, “meta” and “morphy”, where the first means -in a broad sense- the medium, or the action that 
implies a medium, or the reason of such an action, while the word “morphy” is the Greek translation of 
the notion of “form”. As a result, “metamorphono” means the gradual transition from one status to 
another, and in this context, it is the transition from the intangible state of an idea, to its tangible form.  
80 Court of Appeals, Thessaloniki, Decision No. 1929/2007 
81 Court of First Instance (Multimember Panel), Athens, Decision No. 1701/2015 
82 Court of Appeals, Athens, Decision No. 2969/2012 
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Correspondingly, the common approach of human relationships that the 
broadcasted-on a-daily-basis television series usually display -further defined as the 
“intertemporal cliché” that the relevant plots (even in various versions) almost 
identically present-, was considered as reducing to a minimum any possibility of original 
expressive contributions into the intrinsic elements of a screenplay which had not been 
visualized into an audiovisual work; as a result, neither the plot, nor the characters, or 
the dialogues, or the number of protagonists are eligible for copyright protection 
components since they come closer to the commonplace of ideas.83 Further elaborating 
on the notion of “idea”, defined as the stimulus for the creation of a work (in the lack of 
which a form cannot exist), and the term of “expression” as the form through which this 
idea is externalized, it has been stated that the expression of the (common) conception 
of the idea to create and incorporate waxworks into a museum’s restoration and 
refurbishment, constitutes its (common) implementation in practice, thus including the 
construction of the artworks, along with the selection of the theme, character and style 
that each waxwork would represent, the choice of the materials to be used, and the 
decision – making on the scenic environment of each artistic composition, together with 
their configuration into the exhibition context. 84 Concluding, Greek case law has 
recognized that the rationale behind this fundamental distinction between an “idea” 
and its “form of expression” performs the same function in all legal systems, thus 
allowing the access of the public to the information or the idea embodied into a work, 
while granting to the author the absolute and exclusive right to exploit the particular 
form through which this information or idea have been expressed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Court of Appeals, Athens, Decision No. 2932/2006 
84 Court of First Instance (Multimember Panel), Ioannina, Decision No. 134/2013 
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2.3.2 The Common Law Approach of Copyright and the Role of Dichotomy 
 
It is true that idea/expression dichotomy is inextricably aligned with the differentiated 
requirements applying in relation to the qualification of a “work” as copyright 
protected. Although the “Berne Convention” has explicitly dictated that “the enjoyment 
and exercise” of copyright “shall not be subject to any formality”85, many common law 
copyright systems have incorporated deposit or registration requirements which, 
nonetheless, are optional86 in order to run in compliance with the treaty’s proviso. Still, 
the prerequisite of fixation, as adopted across the common world, evidences its 
discrepancy in relation to the civil law “author’s inherent integrity” approach; however, 
it could be argued that the two copyright traditions are in sync towards the recognition 
of idea/expression dichotomy as a principal doctrine, even if deriving from contradictory 
backgrounds.  
In this sense, the codification of the dichotomy under the United States 
copyright law in 197687, consists the most notable example, since it has been said that 
its realization as a “central axiom” traversing the determination of copyright’s subject - 
matter has been strongly stimulated since the 19th century, as respectively 
incorporated and gradually developed by the case law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Further imposing that such exercise and enjoyment “shall be independent of the existence of protection 
in the country of origin of the work” (under article 5(2)). 
86 Under 1976 U.S. Copyright Act, a notice of copyright “may be placed” on publicly distributed copies, 
phonorecords of the sound recordings and on separate copies of collective works, while “the owner of 
copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering 
to the Copyright Office the deposit”, as specified under the law. (s. 401, 402, 404, 408). Moreover, under 
the Canadian Copyright Act, “the Register of Copyrights is evidence of the particulars entered in it”, while 
“a certificate of registration of copyright is evidence that the copyright subsists and that the person 
registered is the owner of the copyright”. The same applies in the cases of an assignment of copyright or 
of a license granting an interest in a copyright. Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, s. 53(1,2). 
87 “in no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it 
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work”: 1976 U.S. Copyright Act: Title 17. U.S.C., 
section 102(b). 
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As a result, the implementation of the doctrine by the constitutional proviso has 
been regarded as not introducing an innovation, but as solemnly proclaiming that the 
principal distinction between the expression and an idea remains unchanged, thus 
consisting an intrinsic guarantee provided by copyright law per se.88 However, 
idea/expression dichotomy is rather interconnected and as such, affected by the overall 
designation and the rationale behind the U.S. copyright law89, under which the 
“overriding priority” is the “public’s ultimate benefit from creativity”90 (in contrary with 
the civil law copyright tradition under which the rights of the author of a copyrighted 
work and the rights of the public shall be equally pursued and as such, fairly balanced), 
while providing, in addition, the requirement of fixation, according to which a work is 
eligible for copyright protection only if the expression (of an idea) is physically 
incorporated into a tangible medium.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Athanasopoulos, Evangelos Sp., See n.47.  
89 In this context, American copyright law, compared with the civil law droit d’ auteur copyright systems 
and for most, with French law -perceived as more favorable and thus, more protective of authors’ rights 
(with regard to both their economic and moral aspects)-, has been characterized as incorporating and 
overall reflecting a rather “utilitarian” and “materialistic” approach; described as a purely “economic 
legislation” or as a “mere tool of capitalism”, the purpose of American copyright law is widely considered 
as primarily centered to protect “the authors’ pecuniary and exploitative interests”, in contrast with 
French jurisprudence that considers copyright as a natural right deriving from the author’s own 
personality. However, it has been argued that both French and United States copyright systems are 
“equally fair” in terms, inter alia, of copyright’s subject matter; in this sense, the recognition of the 
distinction between an idea and its expression, under United States copyright law, constitutes a 
prominent defense. Piotraut, Jean-Luc, “An Author's Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and 
Morality of French and American Law Compared”, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 24, 
Issue 2, 2006, pp. 550 - 555 
90 In this context, the author’s rights and interests are “secondary” to those of the public, and as a result, 
the property rights afforded to copyright owners are “limited” in relation to other copyright jurisdictions 
(including the United Kingdom’s copyright law, but for most, the civil law tradition). Kearns, Paul, 
“Freedom of Artistic Expression: Essays on Culture and Legal Censure”, Hart Publishing, 2013, pp. 135 - 
149 
91 1976 U.S. Copyright Act (s.102(a)) provides that “copyright protection subsists in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”. 
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Indeed, fixation constitutes the central prerequisite for the subsistence of 
copyright protection in common law jurisprudence92, generally perceived as the 
transfiguration of an intangible idea into its tangible form. Consequently, it is also 
implicated in the identification and assessment of copyright infringement, since a work 
is capable of being copied, provided that it was embodied in a physical form; musical 
compositions constitute a characteristic example of this requirement since they fall 
within the copyright regime if the individual performer arranges or adapts a musical 
score (in ordinary notation) into a particular rendition, that is further copyrightable if 
captured upon a physical object that can be made to reproduce it.93 In this context, a 
copyrightable work “cannot come into existence” -and copyright cannot be either 
protected or violated- without fixation in a required and appropriate form94, and this 
principle counts exactly on the separability and copyrightability of an expression in 
contrast with the secluded -by copyright law- idea, even if implicitly dictated. However, 
common law goes one step further, since it coincides the protectable expression with a 
physical carrier, consisting, as such, the crucial point of deviation with droit d’ auteur 
tradition, while also contradicting with the very essence of intangible property and 
immaterial nature of copyright per se.  
 
 
                                                 
92 The 1998 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act defines the eligible for copyright protection literary, 
dramatic and musical works, requiring that they should be respectively “written, spoken or sung” and 
“intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music”, while explicitly declaring that copyright does 
not subsist in such a work, “unless it is recorded, in writing or otherwise” (s.3). This reducing into a 
material form consisted the prerequisite and the means through which a non-protectable idea would be 
eligible for copyright protection since the 1911 Copyright Act. An identical provision, concerning, in 
addition, the requirements imposed for the copyright protection of databases, is found under the 2000 
Copyright and Related Rights Act of Ireland (s.18(1)). In Canada, the prior fixation of a work into a material 
form -towards the identification of the performance of an artistic, dramatic or musical work- is not 
considered as a prerequisite for its qualification as a copyrightable work. However, according to the 
relevant case law, copyright in a work subsists when “expressed, to some extent, in some material form 
capable of identification, and having a more or less permanent endurance”; Canadian Admiral Corp. v. 
Rediffusion, Inc., Ex. C.R. 382, 20 C.P.R.75 (1954). Last, Australia deems, under 1968 Copyright Act, a 
literary, dramatic or musical work as “made” at the time when or the period during which “the work was  
first reduced to writing or to some other material form” (s. 22).  
93 Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (1955). See also n.12. 
94 Adeney, Elizabeth, “Authorship and Fixation in Copyright Law: A Comparative Comment”, Melbourne 
University Law Review, Vol. 35, Issue 2, 2011, p. 679 
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Presupposing the “physical rendering of the copyrightable work in some (tangible) 
form”95 , the “interference” of fixation as the core binding factor that distinguishes a 
mere creative conduct from a copyrighted work, and the author -as the copyright 
holder- from a mere contributor, does not merely entail the distinction between an idea 
and its expression, but it further requires the transition of a work from intangibility to 
corporeality.  
In contrast, such a prerequisite is completely irrelevant in civil law copyright 
jurisprudences96, where “expression” is construed as the manifestation of a work -as the 
externalization of an intellectual creation and its protection by copyright law to the 
extent that such an expression is original-, and not as its transubstantiation to a corpus 
as such, thus following the line of the reasoning behind the abolishment of any kind of 
formalities, and the inversely proportional establishment of automatic copyright 
protection97 in all over the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Loren, Lydia Pallas, “Fixation as Notice in Copyright Law”, Boston University Law Review, Vol. 96, Issue 
3, 2016, p. 947 
96 Greek Copyright Law No. 2121/1993 has explicitly dictated that it is “with the creation of a work” 
(emphasis added) that intellectual authors shall have the right to copyright over that work (article 1). 
Moreover, French Intellectual Property Code has stated, that the author of a work of the mind shall enjoy 
in that work, by the mere of its creation, an exclusive incorporeal property right which shall be 
enforceable against anyone [mine translation] (L 111 – 1)].  
97 Dictated by the “Berne Convention” and described as the “most important and advantageous provision 
of the Union”. Foster, Robert W., “International Copyright Protection”, South Carolina Law Quarterly, Vol. 
3, Issue 1, 1950, p. 69 
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Indeed, if “history has shown that formalities in copyright law are just plain 
wrong”98, the absorption of fixation seems to profoundly clash with the doctrine of 
automatic copyright protection99, under which copyright is afforded automatically “with 
a creation of a work” (even if unfinished), and which is moreover defined, determined 
and eventually qualified on and ad-hoc basis determination, under the fundamental 
principles of idea/expression dichotomy and originality as inexorably intertwined.100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 In relation to the “rigid” registration requirements as adopted in the U.S. copyright law in 19th century 
and which have been gradually -especially since the 1976 Act- eliminated. Levine, Arthur, “The End of 
Formalities: No More Second-Class Copyright Owners”, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 
13, Issue 2, 1995 
99 Further aligned with the principle of territoriality in copyright law, under which the protection afforded, 
sought and enforced by copyright owners is based on (or limited to) a country-by-country basis, as a 
“country’s prescriptive competence ends at its borders”. Territorial protection of copyright means that 
there are as many copyrights as the countries that ratified the “Berne Convention”, where national 
copyright laws govern every aspect of the protection afforded to copyright holders, and for most, the 
exceptions and limitations provided -since they are, in any case (according to the international and 
regional legislative instruments in the area which only demand the application of the “three-step test”) 
subject to the national lawmaker’s decision and competency. This principle is determinative in 
international copyright cases, especially in relation to infringing -to copyright- acts and uses which take 
place in another country (or more than one countries) since the author is protected only under the 
relevant national legislation; in our days, the principle of territoriality is profoundly relevant, due to the 
cross-border nature of the internet and the “increased global use of digital transmission networks”. 
Goldstein, Paul, “International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice”, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 
65 – 67. Read more about the principle of territoriality in EU Copyright law and the need to be revisited in 
the light of the invasion and the challenges imposed by the digital environment, at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568348/EPRS_BRI(2015)568348_EN.pdf, as 
accessed in December 2017.  
100 Stipulating that an expression shall be isolated from the idea, the criterion for respectively 
distinguishing the protectable component of a work from the non-protectable elements, can be nothing 
else than originality, construed as the author’s personal creative contribution. Elaborating on this 
definition, it has been said that those elements of a work which descend from pre-existing free sources 
(i.e. the nature, the life, the ideas that freely circulate, the totality of cultural heritage), remain free even 
after their integration into an intellectual creation. In contrast, the components that fall within the 
author’s exclusive control are those which have been, for the first time, created by the author and are, as 
such, appended to the first ones. In this sense, the norm of originality displays a twofold significance: not 
only does it allow the distinction between the copyrightable works and the “intellectual articles” which 
are not protected by copyright (as they cannot even be qualified as “works”), but it also constitutes the 
decisive criterion for the division between a work’s protectable and non-protectable components, thus 
between the expression and the idea. See n.57, p.116 
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2.4 The Interface between the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Originality, and the 
Implication of the Merger Doctrine 
 
Although implicitly but rather paradoxically incorporating the division between an idea 
and its expression, it could be argued that the fixation requirement is, in addition, 
contradictory to the recognition and establishment of originality as the “sole 
prerequisite for copyright protection” under (and after) the landmark rulings of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union.101 Identifying or more accurately, re-establishing 
the norm of originality, while bringing an end to the differentiated interpretations of all 
concepts of European law -thus providing for their “uniform and autonomous” 
application-, the court manifested that no other criteria -with regard to all types and 
every single work- shall apply in order to determine the eligibility for (copyright) 
protection.  
 
 
                                                 
101 The cornerstone “Infopaq” case laid the foundations on the determination of copyright protection 
throughout the European Union, stating that “copyright is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-
matter (any subject – matter and not only photographs, databases and software) which is original, in the 
sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation”, further extending copyrightability to the parts of a 
work insofar “they share the originality of the whole work”, while also dictating -with regard to isolated 
elements of a work such as words- that it is “only through the choice, sequence and combination that the 
author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result which is an intellectual 
creation”: Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009], judgment of 16 
July 2009 ECR I-656; Therefore, the notion of creativity was defined as the “creative freedom” which is 
“necessary for the purposes of copyright”, excluding, as such, sporting events and in particular, football 
matches from the scope of copyright protection since they are “subject to the rules of the game”: Joined 
Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Karen Murphy, judgment of 4 
October 2011, [2011] ECR I-9083; Whereupon, “Painer case” further elaborated on the notion of 
originality, underlying that a work “is to be considered original if it is the author’s own intellectual 
creation reflecting his personality”. For this purpose and qualification, an author shall stamp the work 
with his “personal touch” and express “his free and creative choices” in the production of the work; in 
addition, the court stated that “no other criteria such as merit or purpose” shall be taken into account: 
Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH and others [2013], judgment of 7 March 2013 
(nyr); it was then in “Football Dataco” that the court examined the common law criteria of copyrightability 
(i.e. the skill and labour judgment and its relevancy in the assessment of copyright protection to 
databases, if significant) and their potential success in the “EU originality” test. The answer was negative, 
as the court declared that for the purpose of assessing copyrightability to a database, “any intellectual 
effort and skill on the creation of data” is irrelevant (since a database may attract copyright protection by 
virtue of its structure, namely the selection or the arrangement of its contents and not the contents as 
such), while also providing that “the significant labour and skill required for setting up a database cannot, 
as such, justify such a protection if they do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of 
the data which that database contains.”: Case C-604/10, Football Dataco Ltd and Others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd 
and Others [2012], Judgment of 1 March 2012 (nyr). 
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Preempting, as such, the copyright perception of Anglo-Saxon legal systems102, while 
also reaffirming the principle of copyright’s neutrality under which any aesthetic 
judgments or moral considerations are (or should be) irrelevant in copyright 
adjudication103, the three -plus one- prerequisites that have to be cumulatively fulfilled for 
the qualification of a work as copyright protected, constitutes a fully harmonized concept 
in European copyright law that could be sententiously described as: i) requiring for an 
intellectual creation, ii) from the fields of words, art or science -falling, in practice, 
within any realm of intellectual processing and induction-, iii) that is further expressed in 
some form -construed as its capability of being perceived by the human senses and not as 
its physical incorporation into a tangible medium-, which should, in turn, iv) satisfy the 
originality criterion as specifically identified and uniformly applying. As a result, it is the 
assessment of originality that respectively engenders copyrightability or provokes a 
copyright infringement; “but that a line is drawn, at a level of abstraction, where the 
“idea/expression” line is crossed”104. But what if such a line cannot be crossed? 
 
                                                 
102 Including -beyond the fixation requirement - the so- called “pedestrian” approach of originality under 
the “skill and labour judgment” which provided that a work is original (and thus copyrightable) if 
exhibiting or resulting from the author’s “own skill, labour, judgment and effort”, linking as such 
originality with the investment made on the production of a work (considering that it is by virtue of that 
investment “against unfair competition” that the author should be rewarded under copyright). 
Rahmatian, Andreas, “Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labour” Doctrine Under 
Pressure”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2013. 
This conception of originality in the UK’s copyright system -and in all legal systems adopting and focusing 
on “instrumental justifications” of copyright- is regarded as a “minimum” criterion for assessing 
copyrightability to a work, merely depending on the “effort expended to produce the work, and not (on) 
the features of the work itself”, consisting an -over a century- dominant position that has been 
interpreted in varying levels, resulting, as such, to contradictory outcomes. Manning, Colin, “English & 
Continental Tests of Originality: Labour, Skill, and Judgement versus Creations of the Mind”, 2016, p.4, 
online available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2782052, as accessed in December 2017.  
103 Copyright law has designated a tailored -under its scope- framework for the judicial interpretation of 
copyright rules and principles, under which copyright protection is granted to a work irrespective of its 
value, destination or investment made, illustrating as such the neutral character of copyright that has 
been further incorporated in national law provisions (Greek Copyright Act No. 2121/1993: article 2§4; 
French Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle: art. L. 112 – 1). Moreover, as copyright law is closely linked 
with art -forming the principal grounds of the controversies and disputes arising-, the interpretative 
principle, defined as the “doctrine of avoidance”, provides that any “implicit aesthetic criteria” shall be 
avoided to judicial practice, characterized as “dangerous undertakings” that the courts are untrained or 
incompetent to address. Walker, Robert Kirk and Depoorter, Ben, “Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in 
Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard”, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 109, No.2, 
2015 
104 Gervais, Daniel J., “Restructuring Copyright: A Comprehensive Path to International Copyright Reform” 
(Elgar Monographs in Intellectual Property Law), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017 
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If originality lays on the distinction between an idea and its expression, the “merger 
doctrine” precludes the interference and application of the dichotomy (and as such, 
copyrightability), thus providing that if there is essentially only one way to express an 
idea, as in the case of a “bald statement of fact”105, then this expression merges with the 
idea itself, becoming a non-protectable work for the purposes of copyright. It is by virtue 
of this “narrow” subject - matter106 -such as a “straightforward and simple” rule for a 
sales promotional contest of the "sweepstakes" type involving the social security numbers 
of the participants-, as necessarily requiring “only one (or, at best), a limited number of 
forms of expression”, that copyrighting cannot be permitted, since, otherwise, all the 
possibilities of future use of its substance would be exhausted.107  
Indeed, “if an idea and the expression of the idea are so tied together”, they are 
consolidated to form one, and in particular, to the “ideal form” that shall be free to be 
used by anyone. As a consequence, “by denying protection to an expression that is 
merged with the underlying idea”, as in the case of real estate ownership topographical 
maps, a monopoly over an idea is prevented, and inversely, copying is not prohibited108 
since there is no copyright to infringe. Similarly, a design of jewelry bee pins that 
“copied” the size and the form of bees in nature consists the “sole way” of expressing the 
underlying idea, being, consequently, incapable of attracting either creativity, or 
originality. Indeed, a differentiated outcome would inadmissibly grant exclusivity over 
this bare idea of the mind, preventing, as such, anyone else from feasibly using bees as a 
motive for the creation of any (copyrightable) work.109 
                                                 
105. Consumers Union Inc. v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 199 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) 
106 Operating complementary to the “merger doctrine”, the “scènes à faire doctrine” provides, in addition, 
for a “common theme” -such as the Vietnam war, or a setting of a dinosaur zoo or an adventure park- 
from which "a sequence of events that necessarily result from the choice of a setting or situation, do not 
enjoy copyright protection”: Davis v. United Artists Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Williams v. 
Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996). More specifically, “scènes à faire” includes tock images, tried 
and true story lines, fables and folklore, scenes of nature, common visual and cultural references, all of 
which fall under the title of “scenes that must be done”, and they are not copyrightable since falling 
within the public domain. Murray, Michael D., “Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scenes a Faire 
and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works”, Baylor Law Review, Vol. 58, Issue 3, 2006, pp. 781-782 
107 As it has been stated, notwithstanding the fact that a particular form of expression does not derive 
from the subject – matter per se, if “permitting the copyrighting of its expression”, then the subject – 
matter would be appropriated. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) 
108 The maps displayed copyright notices, pictorially portraying the location, size, and shape of surveys, 
land grants, tracts, and various topographical features within Montgomery County. Mason v. Montgomery 
Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992) 
109 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp v. Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738 (1971). The court ruled that, in this case, 
“making an expression exclusive, makes the idea exclusive”.  
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III. “Where” and “How” Shall the Line be Drawn: Setting the “Problem” 
Despite its universal recognition as the “essence of copyright”, idea/expression 
dichotomy has been “targeted” as insufficient, incapable, or even inappropriate to serve 
as a “fundamental determinant for deciding what is protectible under copyright law”, 
allegedly consisting not the solution to the problem, but the root of the problem 
itself.110 It has been even suggested that the dichotomy should be abandoned in the 
adjudication of copyright infringement claims, either because it has been criticized and 
questioned, or by virtue of its terminology which is considered as not serving the 
creation of “market conditions” -which are considered as encouraging themselves the 
production of works of art and science-, or due to its vagueness which comprises the 
most “fertile” ground for this assumption.111 Nonetheless, idea/expression dichotomy 
does not only “interfere” in the judicial reasoning and subsequent decision-making; it 
constitutes the central axiom that the courts “time and again have continued to 
embrace”112, even if it probably constitutes the “most difficult concept”113 of copyright 
law.  
 
                                                 
110 Based on a rather oversimplification of the notion of “idea”, regarded as incapable of existing “apart 
from some expression”. Jones, Richard, “The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law”, 
Pace Law Review, Volume 10, Issue 3, 1990, p.552. However, it is the pivotal prerequisite of originality 
that could operate as a forceful defense, especially in the light of European copyright law, since under U.S. 
jurisdiction is aligned with the “necessary modicum” or the “minimal degree” of creativity (In Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1296, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991): 
See n.155). Moreover, it should also be noted that under U.S. jurisdiction, a certificate of copyright’s 
registration is not only considered as prima facie evidence of the validity of copyright, but also of 
originality, profoundly contradicting with the European approach. Judi Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 
262 (2d Cir. 2001) 
111 Under this perceptive, the distinction between an idea and its expression is not a dichotomy but a 
“metaphor”, since its substantive terms do not constitute “mutually exclusive aspects of a work”; under 
the concept of “metaphor”, “ideas” would be defined as the non-protectable elements of a work, and 
"expression" would (merely) imply the “compilation and arrangement of the unoriginal materials”, 
allegedly comprising a “clear” distinction that the “dichotomy” term cannot serve. Wilde, Edward C, 
“Replacing the Idea/Expression Metaphor with a Market-Based Analysis in Copyright Infringement 
Actions”, Whittier Law Review, Vol. 16, Issue 3, 1995, pp. 793-803 
112  Jain, Sankalp, “The Principle of Idea-Expression Dichotomy: A Comparative Study of US, UK & Indian 
Jurisdictions”, 2012, p.2, online available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2229628 
113 Plix Products Ltd v. Frank M. Winstone (Merchants) Ltd [1986] F.S.R. 63 (New Zealand: High Court), 
affirmed [1986] F.S.R. 608 (New Zealand: Court of Appeal), in 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/844/wipo_pub_844.pdf, p.27, as accessed in 
December 2017 
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Since the “subject – matter questions are prior to scope questions”, and consequently 
the identification on “what gets on the balance” precedes the consideration of the 
equilibrium sought between the entitlements of the authors and the users over the 
subject - matter at issue114, idea/expression dichotomy as the “more basic or more often 
repeated” axiom than a single copyright principle115 -thus determining what is and what 
is not protected by copyright law-, has not been (and will not be) abandoned since there 
is “no better way” to “reconcile the two competing societal interests that provide the 
rationale for the granting of and restrictions on copyright protection".116  
However, it is true that although copyright poses one of the “most fundamental, 
deep questions in human understanding”117, the answers given in the national level 
reflect -under the principle of territoriality- the differentiated underlying policies as 
integrated in national copyright legislations. In this sense, if “any attempt to distinguish 
protected from unprotected elements within a copyrighted work requires a 
consideration of the scope of copyright”118, civil law copyright tradition and, especially, 
European copyright law, provides that the sole prerequisite for copyright protection 
(and inversely for the assessment of copyright infringement) is the criterion of originality 
of the primary work; on the contrary, common law copyright systems and foremost, 
copyright law of the United States focuses on whether the defendant’s copying should 
be called a protectable expression of its own, or an unprotected idea. In this context, 
idea/expression dichotomy seeks all possible sources of determination; and if it is the 
lawmaker that builds the framework of legal rules and principles, putting the canvas on 
the easel, the “hand” that holds the pen and draws the line belongs to the judge. 
 
                                                 
114 Drassinower, Abraham, “From Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of Balance in 
Copyright Law”, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 34, Issue 4, 2009, p. 997 
115 Samuels, Edward, “The Idea-Expression dichotomy in Copyright Law”, Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 56, 
Issue 321, 1989 
116 Durham Industries, Inc., Plaintiff-appellee, v. Tomy Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 630 F.2d 905 (2d 
Cir. 1980) 
117 Burk, Dan L., “Expression, Selection, Abstraction: Copyright' s Golden Braid”, Syracuse Law Review, Vol. 
55, Issue 3, 2005, p.61 
118 Kurtz, Leslie A., “Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright”, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 1221, 
1993, p.1233 
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3.1 The Issue of Substantial Similarity (Or Not Just Copying) 
 
Considered as broadening the scope of copyright protection by “relocating” the 
boundaries imposed by idea/expression dichotomy, the (extremely) narrow  
perception of a copyright infringement as an “exact or slavish copying”, has been 
complemented -under the United States jurisdiction- by the principle of “substantial 
similarity” between the allegedly infringed and the infringing work, since the later may 
consist of anything not close to a “word-for-word, line-for-line, or note-for-note” 
fraudulent reproduction119. In this context, it is not only the exact duplication of the 
copyrighted work that would constitute a violation of the author’s (exclusive but not 
absolute120 -under the common law perceptive-) rights, but also the “abduction” of a 
substantial amount of the author's original121 expression, which, in turn, leads to the 
realization122 of the secondary work as substantially similar to the primary one, 
consisting -only under this determination- an infringing work. Seeking for an exploratory 
methodology for the determination of substantial similarity, copying was evaluated 
towards improper appropriation, and abstraction was compared to particularity, 
involving -the first- the issue of access, and the second, the gradual identification of the 
distinct elements of a copyrightable work, as the two most influential tests deriving 
from two cornerstone cases in the area.   
                                                 
119 Samuelson, Pamela, “A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement”, Northwestern 
University Law Review, Vol. 107, Issue 4, 2013, p.1822 
120 Brenner, Lee S. and Rohrer, Allison S., “The De Minimis Doctrine: How Much Copying Is Too Much”,  
Communications Lawyer, Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2006, p.9 
121 The perception of originality -under the U.S. jurisprudence- is profoundly different with the relevant 
determination under the EU Copyright law, although it has been similarly recognized as the “sine qua 
non” of copyright. 
122 This “realization” has been specified into the so – called “Ordinary Observer Test”, under which an 
infringement may be established on the grounds that the “ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect 
the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same": Peter 
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 124 USPQ 154 (1960). This test has been further 
developed into a more “discerning” ordinary’s observer’s inspection which is demanded in cases when a 
work includes both protectable and non-protectable components, while an additional variation is 
considered as applying the general rule of the “intended audience’s” appreciation -namely the members 
of the audience to which the two works address- as fairly represented by the lay “public” and which shall 
decide on the subsistence of substantial similarity: Dawson v. Hinshaw Music 905 F. 2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990). 
In this context, the “type” of observer has been, moreover, defined as the “lay average observer” (in Ideal 
Toy Corporation v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 
528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), which further stated that “the trier of fact must be mindful of the rule 
that copyright protection extends to the author's expression of an idea, but not to the idea itself”.  
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3.1.1 The Interference of Access and the Elements of Infringement 
 
Deriving from the widely-cited Arnstein v. Porter123, the attribution of “substantial 
similarities” between the allegedly infringed and infringing musical compositions has 
been specified in the light of its interconnection -under varying levels of reliance- with 
the principle of access124, and the defense of independent creation that 
“unintentionally” resulted to a coincided similarity with the primary work. However, 
both considerations in this judicial reasoning relied upon a “two-steps” test that the 
court implemented, under which “infringing” does not mean “copying”; it means 
improperly appropriating the author’s expression since the court stated that the 
question at issue was whether the defendant took from the plaintiff's compositions “so 
much of what is pleasing to the ears of the audience125 for whom such popular music is 
composed”, wrongfully appropriating, as such, the financial returns which belong to the 
plaintiff. 
In this context, if there are no similarities at all, any amount of evidence of 
access is irrelevant and insufficient to prove copying. If similarities exist, along with 
(some) evidence of access, then they must be sufficient enough to prove copying. If 
evidence of access is absent, then the similarities between an allegedly infringed and 
infringing work must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that the plaintiff and 
the defendant independently arrived at the same result.126  As a result, the similarities 
must be profoundly extensive and striking in order to suffice per se (meaning without 
any consideration of access) for the justification and establishment of both copying and 
improper appropriation as a “double-service” evidence.  
                                                 
123 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).  
124 Further construed as basing upon “circumstantial” evidence since direct proof of copying is -in most 
cases- inherently difficult or even impossible. 
125 Thus, if the issue of unlawful appropriation of the author’s expression arises, expert testimonies and 
dissection analysis have been determined as “irrelevant” for the assessment of infringement. 
126 One may argue that the norm of “coincided similarity” as a defense towards a copyright infringement 
claim resembles to the formulation of originality as adopted under Greek copyright case law, defined as 
the “statistically unique criterion” and which is still -along with the EU originality criterion- applying in 
copyright infringement cases. According to the “statistically unique” perception of an eligible for copyright 
protection work, “a work meets the requisite criteria of protectability if another author, under similar 
circumstances and with the same aim in mind, would not reasonably reach the same creative outcome, or 
if the work at issue presents an individual particularity or modicum of creativity such that the work can be 
distinguished from everyday productions” or from other similar or known works”. See n.24, p.23 
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Hence, the court proceeded to a further distinction with regard to the relevance 
and significance of similarities, as merely “alone standing” conditions, for the 
assessment of copying or improper appropriation, thus consisting two separate steps in 
order for an infringement to be asserted. In this sense, if copying is otherwise 
evidenced, then the “proof of improper appropriation need not consist of similarities 
which, standing alone, would support an inference of copying”; in other words, even if 
similarities are found, they unquestionably do not constitute themselves the 
determinative standard attachment for copying. Yet, if enough evidence of access can 
be provided127 “to permit the case to go to the jury”, then these similarities are 
sufficient so that the “jury may properly infer that the similarities did not result from 
coincidence”, reaching, derivatively, the conclusion that the secondary work constitutes 
a copy of a copyrighted work.  
This outcome, though, does not suffice for the assessment of copyright 
infringement, since “copying may be permissible” if coincided with the borrowing of the 
non-protectable (by copyright) ideas of a copyrightable work. However, since U.S. 
Copyright law requires a “minimal degree of creativity” in order for originality, and as 
such, copyrightability to be attributed over an intellectual creation, “original” is merely 
construed as “not copied from previous works”; consequently, even “closely identical or 
even identical works” may attract per se “valid copyrights”. In this sense, a chart copying 
utilized sketches and textual material, depicting and explaining certain exercises 
performed in a multi-station machine, was found as featuring the same -with the 
primary chart- idea, since the only similarities found between the two works at issue 
consisted of the use of the same stick figures and their corresponding positions for each 
exercise. As a result, it has been ruled that “substantial similarity to show that the 
original work has been copied is not the same as substantial similarity to prove 
infringement”.128 
                                                 
127 In relation to computer programs, it has been stated that a plaintiff can establish that the defendant 
had copied his work by providing either direct proof of copying, or (since such a proof is even more 
difficult in software cases), indirect evidence showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted 
program, and that there are probative similarities between the copyrighted and the copied material. 
Gates Rubber Company v. Bando Chemical Industries Limited Usa R, 9 F.3d 823 (1993) 
128 Universal Athletic Sales Co v. Salkeld E Pinchock, 511 F. 2d 904 (1975) 
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Moreover, the copying of a children’s book story line of a lost child to which “the 
familiar face of the mother is the most beautiful face, even though the mother is not, in 
fact, beautiful to most” was not found as infringing copyright, thus identified as an idea 
that falls within the public domain129, a photograph displaying the same angle, pose, 
background, composition, and lighting with the original photograph was found as 
permissibly copying the author’s overall conception which -as a “cousin” of concept- 
was considered as resembling to a non-protectable idea130, and since “nothing 
commands that a copyrighted matter be strikingly unique (or novel), “mezzotint” 
copies131 were qualified as copyrightable “versions” of works in the public domain, thus 
owing their origin to their author even if displaying unintentionally a “sufficiently 
distinguishable variation”.132  
As a result, a violation to copyright is only assessed if a mere copying (consisting 
the first “copying-step”) went “so far” as to constitute an illicit copying, thus an 
improper appropriation of the author’s expression133; in this context, the court -after 
listening to the playing of the compositions in question, found that the likeness between 
them was not -on the issue of misappropriation- substantially “trifling” in order for 
copyright infringement to be asserted.  
 
 
 
                                                 
129 Stating, in particular, that the book and the allegedly infringing illustrative story (published in a 
monthly periodical) merely present the same idea, and as such, “no infringement as to protectable 
expression occurred”. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F. 2d 87, 190 U.S.P.Q. 387 (1976) 
130 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co. 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Furthermore, the court contended 
that the idea/expression dichotomy “breaks down” in the visual arts in general, since “it is impossible, in 
most cases, to speak of the particular "idea" captured, embodied, or conveyed by a work of art, because 
every observer will have a different interpretation”, while an artist’s idea has been construed as, in any 
case, depicting a “particular subject in a particular way”. 
131 Namely copies that reproduce the primary work by engraving its tracing onto a printing plate. 
132 In this sense, the author is entitled to a copyright “if he independently contrived a work” even if such a 
work is completely identical with “what went before”; similarly, he has “no right to prevent another from 
publishing a work identical with his, if not copied from his”. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 
F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) 
133 If the comparison of the works at issue “reveals that their similarity exists only at a level of abstraction 
too basic to permit any inference that defendants wrongfully appropriated any expression of plaintiff's 
ideas”, a violation to copyright cannot be determined. Giangrasso v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 534 F. 
Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) 
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As a result, the assessment of substantial similarity requires a close consideration 
of which aspects of the work are copyrightable”134, and moreover, whether the 
defendant's copying substantially appropriated (and not just copied) these protected 
elements; for example, the unauthorized recreation and incorporation in a film of a 
photograph displaying a blond girl in a pink coat riding piggyback on her father's 
shoulders, was not found to violate copyright, thus the subject – matter of the original 
work was identified as featuring a scene from “reality” -or an “independently existing 
fact”- which cannot be copyrighted by the photographer since he had no role in creating 
it.135 Similarly, the general likeness between a film and a novel depicting the violence 
and urban decay of a New York City Police Department (consisting a “chronicle of true 
events”), was outweighed -notwithstanding the fact that the “same story” was 
presented136- by radical differences in the plot, pace, and dramatic structure of the 
works in question, since the story lines of the film imparted a “continuity and suspense 
entirely missing from the book”; correspondingly, the plaintiff failed in proving 
ownership of a valid copyright137 over the (protectable elements) of the allegedly 
infringed work, as five years later Feist would unambiguously establish as the 
prerequisites to be fulfilled for the assessment of copyright infringement. 
                                                 
134 Namely the author’s expression and not the ideas, theories and facts conveyed by a copyrighted work, 
thus becoming at the moment of publication “instantly available for public exploitation. Golan v. Holder, 
181 L.Ed.2d 835, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) 
135 Harney v. Sony Picture Television, Inc, 704 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2013). In an inverse identification, if 
similarities concern the “ideas or treatments” included in the primary work, identified “at the level of 
expression, as either too general or too insignificant to be protectible”, the claim of copyright violation is 
meritless”. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
136 Since the settings were identical, and police officers were the central characters in both works; 
However, the setting consisted of “real places known to the public through media reportage, and 
accordingly, the notion of telling a police story that takes place there cannot be copyrightable”. Walker v. 
Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2278, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 
(1986) 
137 Regarded as “commonly proved by production of the copyright registration certificate”: See n.79. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the optional, thus voluntary, registration under 1976 Copyright Act, several 
“incentives” were created for a copyright owner to register his copyright, the most significant of which, is 
the right to enforce a copyright in an infringement action (under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)); consequently, the 
mere question arising is when registration occurs, where two diverging approaches have been adopted by 
U.S. jurisprudence. A recent decision stated that an application alone is insufficient for registration, since 
it is the Register of Copyrights Office which, after examining the material deposited, will determine 
whether does it constitute a subject – matter of copyright protection: Fourth Estate Public Benefit v. Wall-
Street.com, LLC, No. 16-13726 (11th Cir. 2017). However, in its petition for certiorari, Fourth Estate argued 
that copyright exists by the virtue of the creation of the work, thus making it independent of an affirmative 
government grant” (implying, as such, the principle of automatic protection of copyright). Masters, Robert 
M., DeFosse, Jonathan R., Cremen, Timothy P. and Ryan, Kevin A., “Intellectual Property Outlook: Cases 
and Trends to Follow in 2018”, 2018, pp. 11 - 12 
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3.2 Abstracting Idea from Expression through Comparison and Filtration: The Test 
It has been said that copyright protection is divided into five levels: the identification of 
its subject – matter (involving the classification of copyright works138), the levels of 
abstraction (where idea/expression dichotomy is implicated), the exceptions and 
limitations applying to copyright, the expiration of the term of protection (following 
which the work falls under the public domain), and the types of restricted acts, forming 
simultaneously the intrinsic and extrinsic boundaries of copyright.  
Focusing on the “levels of abstraction” and its precise content, it has been 
described as the process through which the “details of a copyrighted work are filtered 
and conceptually removed and replaced with generalities”. Comprising the procedure of 
the comparative analysis in order to identify substantial similarity in copyright 
infringement cases139, this methodology -defined as the “Abstraction-Filtration-
Comparison” test140- is developed upon different levels of abstraction -built on a 
pyramid-shaped structure-, moving from the lower level of the most detailed 
components of a work to the higher level, where these elements “become more general 
and common”.141  
                                                 
138 Displaying an additional differentiated perceptive between civil law and common law copyright 
systems; under the United Kingdom’s copyright legislation, described as the “best representative of the 
common law tradition”, a work, for the purposes of copyright, “needs to be a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic work and also needs to be fixed” (1998 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (s.1). This 
classification scheme is provided as a prerequisite for copyrightability, as if a work does not fall within one 
of those realms, it cannot be copyright protected, and as a result, originality constitutes only the second 
level of consideration: see n.22, p.82. In contrary, in civil law tradition and in particular, under Greek 
copyright law, such a classification could only be potentially and on an ad hoc basis implicated, in the case 
when special rules are applicable to specifically classified subject – matter and which further provide a 
higher level of protection, or in other words, a “better or more appropriate and effective protection”. 
Stamatoudi, Irini, “Are Sophisticated Multimedia Works Comparable to Video Games?”, Journal of the 
Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Vol. 48, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 467-468  
139 Which although “not perfect, could be linked to the separation drawn by copyright law between 
protected expression and unprotected ideas. Yankee Candle Co. v. The Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 
25 (1st Cir. 2001) 
140 Applying at both literal (the “tangible and sensate parts of a work as embodied in a physical medium”) 
and non-literal (the “intangible and conceptual”) components of a copyrightable work. Dennis W. K., 
“Copyright Doctrines, Abstraction and Court Error”, Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 2007, p. 
720 
141 For example, under the Nimmer and Nimmer's (1985) comparison between “Romeo and Juliet” and 
“West Side Story”, the components of the two works have been filtered according to this process, 
indicating that “at a lower level of abstraction, thirteen elements of dramatic structure can be found to be 
similar in both stories. Beyond that, specific incidents in the stories make them different from each 
other”. Ibid, pp. 716, 720-723. 
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In this context, the substantive elements of a copyrightable work “drift” -in a graduated 
conceptualization- from the particular (eligible for copyright protection) expression to 
the commonplace of (abstract, thus non-protectable) ideas. Considered as adopting a 
quite similar -but still differentiated- infringement analysis to Arnstein, Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corporation142 introduced the “patterns of abstractions” concept in 
order to decide whether a play presenting a Jewish family living in prosperous 
circumstances in New York was infringed by a motion picture play in which two families 
(Jewish and Irish) live side by side in a state of perpetual enmity in the poorer quarters 
of New York. Stating -and simultaneously overtaking- the inherent difficulty that the 
distinction between an idea -as the elements of a work that fall within the “commons”- 
and expression demonstrates, via the (rather misunderstood) declaration that “nobody 
has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can”, the court manifested 
that it nonetheless comprises the question that courts must answer in nearly all cases, 
concluding, as such, that there is no excuse for not drawing this “arbitrary” line.  
Within this framework, the court stated that “there is a point in this series of 
abstractions where (a great number of patterns of increasing generality in a literature 
work) are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of 
his ideas, to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended”. 
Although described as an implicitly demonstrated suggestion, the court’s premise that 
the defendant took no more than copyright law allowed (if assuming that he has taken 
“anything at all”), has been considered as dictating that even if similarities are found, 
they must reach a too high level in the “abstraction hierarchy” in order to “touch” the 
author’s protectable expression143; moreover, for the purposes of the qualification and 
identification of such an expression, the qualities of particularity and individuality have 
been signified as its substantive features, which the indefinite formation of the concept 
of idea is profoundly incapable of defending. 
                                                 
142 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) 
143 With respect to the court’s decision, it has been argued that this crucial point at the levels of 
abstraction which would simultaneously fix the boundary required between the protectable expression 
and an excluded -from the scope of copyright protection- idea, was not specified, since the court merely 
reaffirmed -in an emphatic, though, declaration- the general principle as encompassed in idea/expression 
dichotomy, while, moreover, indicating that “only relatively high-level abstractions are beyond the scope 
of copyright protection”. See n.101, p.1836 
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Comparing the “alone standing” protectable elements of the plays at issue, the 
court found that their plot and overall structural plan, the main characters, the settings, 
their “most predominant themes”, as well as their total concept and feel144 are not 
substantially similar to the “average  reasonable reader and spectator”, but in contrast, 
they do substantially differ, stating that “when the works are similar at only an abstract 
level, the defendant's work does not infringe because it is not the ideas but only their 
techniques of expression that the copyright law protects”. In an inverse affirmation, 
McDonald’s advertising campaigns copying the characters of a children’s television show 
were not only found to remove the characters from the original physical setting, but 
they did also dissect to analyze the “clothing, colors, features, and mannerisms” of the 
characters, which had developed specific personalities and particular ways of interacting 
with one another and their environment. 145 In addition, copyright in a doll face with an 
“upturned nose, bow lips, and widely spaced eyes” -described as the elements that fall 
within the public domain of an “idea” of a certain type of doll faces -, shall not prevent a 
competitor from making dolls with the exact same characteristics, insofar the author’s 
expression, defined as particularly emphasizing the underlying idea146, has not been 
copied; as a result, the very essence of infringement lies in taking “not a general theme, 
but its particular expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and 
characterization”.147 
                                                 
144 Consisting per se a distinct approach and widely-applied step in infringement determinations, as 
introduced by Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Company, 429 F. 2d 1106 which dictated that “all 
elements of a work shall be considered as a whole”, comprising, as such, the “source” of copyright on 
which the infringement test shall be concentrated; thus, the ordinary observer must be able of 
recognizing substantial similarities with regard to the “total concept and feel” of the works at issue. In this 
context, the “total concept and feel” of a work, along with the  theme, plot, sequence, pace, setting and 
characters, constitute the protectable -under copyright law- elements of a literature: In Williams v. 
Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996), the interest was shifted from a specific investigation of the plot 
and character development to the identification of the works’ “total concept and feel”, thus operating as 
a more appropriate test when a work addresses to children. 
145 Applying the “intrinsic-extrinsic” test for the purposes of determining substantial similarity between 
the author’s expression and the copied material, Krofft (See n.52) reaffirmed, inter alia, the Arnstein’s 
“restriction” of testimonies by experts and dissection analysis as ancillary supporting the trier of the facts 
only within the “extrinsic step”, since it will be the average spectator that will response -in the “intrinsic 
step”- to the question of substantial similarity. Notwithstanding the fact that the court fell “prey to 
defendants' invitation to dissect the works”, it reminded that it is the “combination of many different 
elements which may command copyright protection because of its particular subjective quality”.  
146 Mattel, Inc. v Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983) 
147 Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop: See n.135 
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3.2.1 A “Succesive Filtering Method” and a Significant Outcome 
 
Since copyright law is the “most widely used form” for the legal protection of computer 
programs, the application of idea/expression dichotomy for the determination of the 
subject - matter of copyright protection -applying to their literal elements, including the 
source code, the object code and the assembly language-, has confronted the “inherent 
utility” that these types of works display, along with the increasing value and 
subsequent protection afforded even to their nonliteral and as such, non-protectable 
elements, such as the structure, sequence and organization of the literal code and  user 
interfaces.148 For this reason, the “Abstraction – Filtration – Comparison” test was 
adopted as a three-step methodology for the separation of protectable elements from 
non-protectable material, determining, in parallel, the “magnitude and scope” of the 
distinction between an idea and its expression149. Considered as modifying and 
extending the idea/expression dichotomy in the realm of copyright law, Computer 
Associates v. Altai case150 described this process as the examination of the structural 
components of a computer program at each level of abstraction, in order to determine 
“whether their particular inclusion at that level was idea, or dictated by considerations 
of efficiency so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea, or required by factors 
external to the program itself, or taken from the public domain”, consisting, as such, a 
non-protectable expression.151 
 
 
                                                 
148 Computer programs are copyright protected as literary works “whatever may be the mode or form of 
their expression”: 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (article 4); See also n.61. Under the U.S. copyright law, 
computer programs were explicitly provided as a subject – matter of copyright protection in 1980, while 
specific limitations were also issued to the relevant exclusive rights (Title 17, s.101, 117). However, the 
scope of protection was judicially formulated, thus extended (in 1986) in order to additionally cover the 
nonliteral aspects of a computer program; as a result, the issue of identifying and segregating the 
copyrighted protected elements in order for a copyright infringement to be determined, became the 
principal concern. Martyniuk, Andrew O., “Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Analysis and the Narrowing 
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs”, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 63, Issue 
3, 1995, pp. 1334-1336. 
149 See n.92, p.5 
150 Which applied the test in the field of software, recognizing that computer programs may consist -as 
any given work- of a “mixture of numerous ideas and expressions”. 982 F.2d 693, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 
33369, 119 A.L.R. Fed. 741, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 10213 (2d Cir. N.Y. Dec. 17, 1992) 
151 More specifically, once the first step of abstraction is completed, the non-protectable elements are 
filtered and consequently removed from the scope of copyright protection. As a result, the (remaining) 
protectable elements of a computer program are compared towards their substantial similarity. 
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Defining, as such, the scope of copyright protection, this test has been regarded 
as serving the very purpose of copyright law, since it, moreover, displays the flexibility 
required in order to be able to adapt to the differentiated circumstances, enabling, as 
such, the courts to “decide cases equitably”. What is (even more) significant, though, is 
that idea/expression dichotomy, although consisting a traditional copyright principle 
and in contrast with the relevant argumentation, is widely considered as “especially 
important” also in the realm of computer science and information technology in 
general, since its “growth and advancement depends (exactly) upon the free access to 
already existing ideas and information, which is profoundly guaranteed by 
idea/expression dichotomy; as a consequence, the acceptance and recognition that this 
distinction between the protectable and the non-protectable elements in any copyright 
work constitutes a “difficult, fact-sensitive determination”152, does not mean that its 
significance should be neglected or even underestimated; it only means is that it “needs 
to be handled with care”.153 
One may argue that under the “substantial similarity” doctrine, the dichotomy 
between an idea and its expression -as a “useful analytical tool”154 through which 
copyright infringement (and inversely copyright protection155) is asserted-, involves 
three stages: since an idea undoubtedly comprises an unprotected -by copyright law- 
component, it must be distilled from the author’s particularized expression. 
 
 
                                                 
152 Eland, Stephen H., “The Abstraction-Filtration Test: Determining Non-Literal Copyright Protection for 
Software”, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Issue 3, 1994 
153 Designers Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (t/a Washington DC), (2000) F.S.R. 121 
154 Notwithstanding its “imprecise” character; moreover, the court determined that copyright law “has 
the capacity both to augment and diminish the prospects of creativity”, since its promotion and fostering 
constitutes its “fundamental objective”. Analyzing the effects of this process, it has been stated that “by 
assuring the author of an original work the exclusive benefits of whatever commercial success his or her 
work enjoys, the law obviously promotes creativity; simultaneously, though, copyright law can “reter the 
creation of new works if authors are fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be 
substantially similar to preexisting works”. Since this extending or limitative -in nature- capacity has been 
conceptualized under idea/expression dichotomy, considered as enabling courts to “adjust the tension 
between the competing effects of copyright protection”, its profound significance is reaffirmed. Warner 
Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239-40 (2d Cir.1983) 
155 Since the protectable component of a copyrighted work as the “author’s original expression” is 
determined through the assessment of copyright infringement; and it is exactly this inverse qualification 
of the subject – matter of copyright protection, by virtue of which idea/expression dichotomy has been 
characterized as a “post-factum” qualification. 
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Moreover, this expression shall be original in order to attract copyright protection, since 
it is only the author’s individual and original way of expressing the “instantiating idea” 
that is protected under copyright law, allowing, as such, or at least, not preventing 
others from expressing it in their own way”.156 Following this qualification and 
segregation of copyrightability towards the distinct elements of a work, what must be 
proved is substantial similarity between the allegedly infringed and infringing work, with 
regard, though, to their protectable elements157, assessed either affirmatively or 
negatively.158  
Yet, the examination of substantial similarity as the necessary determination for 
the assessment of copyright infringement is both qualitatively evaluated and 
quantitatively measured; in effect, it is through the quantitative measurement159 that 
the qualitative attribution subsists, comprising a reciprocal, overlapping and as such, 
indissociable interconnection. Under this perception, it is only if an illicit copy -as the 
unlawful appropriation of the author’s expression- is substantially similar to the primary 
work, that it constitutes an offensive -to copyright- use. In order, though, for this 
decision to be made, a quantitative threshold is imposed, referring to the amount of the 
copyrighted work that has been disproportionally used. And this conclusion, leads us to 
the most crucial question as repeatedly posed: how much is too much? 
                                                 
156 See n.72, p. 601 
157 In this context, these three stages consist simultaneously the three defensive arguments that may be 
analogously raised: first, it could be contented that the similar elements found between the works at issue 
are the non-protectable ones (falling as such within the public domain). Secondly, that the isolated 
protectable elements are, in essence, dissimilar and as such, substantial similarity does not subsist. And 
last, a defendant may argue that he had the right to use the portion taken under the merger or the “scène 
a faire” doctrines, operating, as such, as affirmative defenses. Wallace, Rachael, “Framing the Issue: 
Avoiding a Substantial Similarity Finding in Reproduced Visual Art”, Washington Journal of Law, 
Technology & Arts, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 107 - 108 
158 For example, Williams v. Chrichton (See n.150) stated that dissimilarity between some elements of the 
works will not automatically relieve the infringer of liability, since it is “only when the similarities between 
the protected elements of the allegedly infringed and infringing work are of small import either 
quantitatively or qualitatively, that the defendant will be found innocent of infringement”.  
159 In contrast with European copyright law, under which even 11 words were found to suffice for the 
assessment of copyright infringement under the landmark “Infopaq case”: See n.63. In this sense, “even 
small extracts of works (or even only one word under Greek copyright tradition) may qualify for copyright 
protection as long as they contain elements, which are the expression of the intellectual creation of the 
author of the work”. See n.5. As a result, the comparison of any “substantial” portion taken is completely 
irrelevant and moreover, inadmissible, as there shall not be taken any part at all (if that part is qualified as 
an original expression).  
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IV. SO FAR TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR, SO MUCH TO INFRINGE 
Reconsidering the aim pursued under the American copyright law, under which 
copyright primarily serves the public purpose of access to the products of the authors’ 
genius, the segmentation of the protectible elements of a copyrightable work 
-actualized through the “levels of abstractions” test- is, in effect, achieved when this 
consecutive procedure arrives at a point “so far removed from the author's original 
creation as to strip that creation of expression and yield an unadorned idea”160; yet, this 
demarcation primordially constitutes the means for promoting “social welfare”, and as a 
consequence, idea/expression dichotomy constitutes an “economic cost-benefit 
calculation”.161  
In this sense, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the making of 
individual copies of television shows for the (qualified as) nonprofit and non-commercial 
purposes of “time-shifting” (namely the recording of a program in order to be viewed at 
a later -from its initial broadcast programming- time, which has been further considered 
as the practice principally exercised by the average member of the public which uses 
home videotape recorders) does not constitute a copyright infringement; as it has been 
stated, if a differentiated outcome would be concluded, the scope of the statutory 
monopoly granted to copyright owners would be unduly enlarged, permitting, as such, a 
copyright privilege over the control of articles of commerce, which is neither the 
subject, nor the scope of copyright protection. 162 
 
                                                 
160 In other words, at the point where in a series of progressive abstractions expression ends, and idea 
begins”. Reznick, Allan E., “Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.: Copyright Protection 
for Computer Formats and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy”, Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal, 
Vol. 8, Issue 1, 1980, pp. 69-70 
161 In this vision, the required equilibrium between the rights and interests of the authors (seeking a 
narrower interpretation of the concept of ideas as traversing the non-protectable elements within their 
works) and those of the public (aiming at a restricted qualification of protectable expressions), is achieved 
by the economic analysis and subsequently “economic interpretation” of both originality and 
idea/expression dichotomy doctrines. Yen, Alfred C., “The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory”, 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 2, 1992, pp. 426-427 
162 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Consisting an “unprecedent attempt” to 
impose copyright liability upon the distributors of copying devices, Sony was accused as a “contributory” 
copyright infringer due to the manufacture and marketing of VTR’s, through which consumers recorded 
(copyright protected) television programs exhibited on the public airwaves. 
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Moreover, the exclusion -beyond ideas- of raw facts and information as explicitly 
provided in the Berne Convention163, seems prima facie as featuring (at least, more) 
transparency or clarity, since “there is nothing in copyright law that denies the public 
the use of concepts or facts brought out in the copyrighted materials”.164 However, if 
originality (and as such, copyrightability) could be conferred upon white pages of a 
telephone directory, why is the standard of protectability lowered in fact-based works? 
Is there an “implied license to use”165 the facts and information incorporated in a 
copyrightable work by virtue of their “social utility”, or does their own nature and 
idiosyncratic characteristics preclude the substantial similarity as required (also) in 
quantitative terms?166  
4.1 Uncopyrighting Facts and the Issue of Compilations 
 
Drawing the line between the uncopyrightability of names, towns and telephone 
numbers (as facts), and the potential protectability of factual compilations167, in 
particular, of white pages listings that have been used without the owners’ prior 
authorization, Feist168 took a step backward, forming, as such, the way forward. 
                                                 
163 Providing that “the protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous 
facts having the character of mere items of press information” (article 2(8)).  
164 Marke, Julius J., “Copyright and Intellectual Property”, Albany Law Review, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 1967, p. 50 
165 Wei, George, “Certainty of Subject-Matter in the Development of Intellectual Property: Please Sir, I 
Want Some More”, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2009, Issue 2, 2009, p.487 
166 As Nichols has dictated “we have to decide how much” from the copyrightable work fell to the public 
domain, since copyright does not cover everything that might be drawn from it.  
167 As provided by TRIPs Agreement (article 10(2)): See n.69 
168 Feist Publications (See n.100); Rural and Feist involved into a litigation when the first (the sole 
telephone service provider in Kansas, granted with a monopoly status as the only certified public unity 
under this scope of activities) refused to provide Feist (a publishing company specialized in area-wide 
telephone directories) its white pages listings, under the “unlawful purpose to extend its monopoly in 
telephone service to a monopoly in yellow pages advertising” (Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist 
Publications, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610, 622 (Kan. 1990)), since, moreover, both entities were found to 
“vigorously compete for yellow pages advertising”. Feist used Rural’s white pages listings without its 
consent; despite a number of modifications applied, the fact was that 1,309 of the 46,878 listings in Feist's 
1983 directory were identical to listings in Rural's 1982-1983 white pages. Rural brought a lawsuit alleging 
copyright infringement while Feist alleged that the subject - matter of copying was not protectable under 
copyright. The District Court ruled in Rural’s favour, recalling previous case law that has determined 
telephone directories as a copyright protected subject - matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Thus, the 
Supreme Court had to determine whether the names, towns and telephone numbers copied by Feist are 
covered by Rural's copyright in its directories.  
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Posing the question on why facts are not copyright protected, the answer was found in 
the identification of originality, determined as laying upon two solid axes: 
i) independent creation (meaning not-copied from pre-existing works), and ii) minimum 
degree of creativity, setting, as such, an extremely low standard of originality as even a 
“slight amount of creativity will suffice”.169 Still though, facts are merely discovered, 
while works are created, and as a consequence, “facts” are not “works”. Since facts do 
not owe their origin to an act of authorship, no one can claim originality as to facts, 
whether scientific, historical, biographical, or news of the day; in this regard, the story 
life and death of a notorious gangster (as incorporated in a script) was found to lack 
originality, thus comprised of historical (or contemporary) facts, or previously published 
fictional material, while material traceable to “common sources, the public domain, or 
folk custom” is similarly incapable of attracting originality, and as such, 
copyrightability.170  
However, if facts indisputably belong to the public domain, their compilation as a 
choice that determines their selection or arrangement, implicates both independent 
creation and some (minimal) degree of creativity as exercised by the author. If, 
moreover, this particular manner in which the compiler has selected and arranged the 
raw facts -consisting the “only conceivable expression”- is qualified as original, then it is 
this selection and arrangement that meets the constitutional minimum for copyright 
protection. Nonetheless, even if a factual compilation may consist a copyrightable work, 
and irrespective of the degree of originality (or “how much original authorship”) it may 
feature, the protection afforded is limited as never extending -even through their 
association- to the facts themselves.171 
 
                                                 
169 Moreover, Feist clarified that originality shall not be confused with novelty, since original does not 
mean new. A work may be qualified as “original” even if it resembles to a preexisting one, unless this 
similarity is a result of copying. 
170 Since in the case when the material that is similar is not original with the author, there is no 
infringement. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
171 Reaffirming, as such, that since ideas and information are by no means original with the author, “it is 
only the means of expression of these ideas and themes, or the manner of use and development of those 
characters that such an intellectual creation may be (copyright) protected. Fuld v. National Broadcasting 
Company, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  
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As a result, in the same vein as ideas, facts become free to be taken, used, “restated or 
reshuffled by second comers, even if the author was the first to discover the facts or to 
propose the ideas”. In this context, the court ruled that the contentious white pages 
incorporated basic information as provided by its subscribers, further arranged in 
alphabetical order; consisting a “too mechanical”, or a “routine” listing as to preclude 
any creativity, the (indisputably) substantial portion of the data taken by Feist did not 
amount to a copyright infringement, since there were essentially more than one ways 
for the arrangement or coordination of such data. 172 
Characterized as a cornerstone case in the area, Harper & Row v. Nation173 
concerned a copyright infringement claim based upon the unauthorized use and 
publication of an article including 300 – 400 words from President Ford’s previously 
unpublished memoirs, defined as a “historical narrative or autobiography” intended to 
induce the creation of new material of potential historical value. Stipulating that “no 
author may copyright facts or ideas”, it has been stated that the required distinction to 
be made in works including reports of news events or factual developments in general, 
shall be centered upon the “substance of the information” and "the particular form of 
collocation of words in which the writer has communicated.  Further specifying 
“expression” as the “author's analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures 
the material and marshals the facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to 
particular developments”, it has been manifested that what is protected by copyright 
law is the particular manner of expression that “displays the stamp of the author's 
originality”.174 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Feist Publications (See n.174); this material did not “owe its origin” to Rural but to the public domain, 
consisting, as such, a non-protectable -by copyright- subject matter.  
173 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) 
174 One may argue that this case did not only apply the “balancing definitional test” between the author’s 
expression and the free communication of ideas in order to achieve the required equilibrium, but also 
declared “how much” is allowed or not to be taken, adopting, for this purpose, a definition of originality 
that resembles to the EU originality criterion as formulated by the Court of Justice of European Union.  
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4.1.1 Facts v. Expression: Between Compliance and Divergency 
 
However, if the lack of originality to historical or contemporary facts emphatically 
dictates their exclusion from the scope of copyright protection, since they fall within the 
“common sources”, why wouldn’t this ascertainment suffice per se for the 
determination of the subject - matter of copyright protection, further implying the need 
to “preconceive” the intended purpose of the author of an historical work, and to 
subsequently afford him with a “lowered” level of protection?  
It is true that the threshold imposed on the author’s monopoly over facts and 
information, limiting, as such, copyright only to a particular form of expression175, serves 
as a self-evident act of preserving the principal objective of social welfare under 
common law copyright systems, actualized by the public’s free access and use of such 
non-protectable components of a work.  However, even if the result reached runs in 
compliance with the civil law copyright tradition176, the investigation and determination 
of the author’s purpose as aiming “to add to the knowledge possessed by the reader 
and, perhaps in the process, to increase the sum total of human experience and 
understanding”, “compelling”, as such, or at least, allowing the “wider use of a historical 
work than a novel” 177, is completely contradictory with the qualification of a work -by 
and of itself- as copyright protected, along with the abolishment of differentiated levels 
of protection under EU copyright law; moreover, the fundamental principle of 
copyright’s neutrality is circumvented, thus providing that the purpose of the author, his 
personality, the content of a work, his aesthetic value or any moral implications, are (or 
shall be) completely irrelevant to the protection afforded by copyright law; after all, one 
may argue that it is by virtue of the axiom of copyright’s impartiality, that its validity and 
reliability are profoundly ensured.  
 
                                                 
175 Ice TV Pty. Ltd. v. Nine Network Australia Pty. Ltd. [2009] HCA 14 
176 Since both copyright traditions inherently incorporate and serve the principle of “public interest” for 
the establishment of “idea (or facts, or information)/expression dichotomy”, which is “translated”, across 
the common world, as “rooted in the social utility”.  
177 Ravenscroft v. Herbert and New English Library Ltd. [ 1980] R.P.C. 193 (Ch. D.) 
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4.2 The Utilitarian Aspects of a Copyrighted Work: Methods, Function, Technology 
 
Back in 1879, the origins of idea/expression dichotomy can be traced to Baker v. 
Selden178, which distinguished a literature work analyzing a bookkeeping system with 
the art intended to illustrate or the manufacture described therein.179 Declaring that 
“the novelty of the art or the thing described or explained has nothing to do with the 
validity of the copyright” -thus, being interrelated only with the protection granted by 
patent law-, the court held that the lines and figures incorporated in a book are the 
“mere language employed by the author to convey his ideas more clearly”, converting, 
as such, the author’s expression to the idea expressed which is not copyright 
protected.180 As a result, if an author seeks exclusivity over such a work, “he must obtain 
a patent for the mixture as a new art, manufacture, or composition”; if not, the art 
described or illustrated is open and free to the use of the public, and an infringement to 
copyright may only subsist on a “direct copying from the pages of the book”.  
Similarly, the “protection for the aesthetic” towards a work of fine arts which 
incorporates and features, as its intended purpose, mechanical or utilitarian aspects -
such as statuettes used as bases for fully equipped electric lamps-, is not beauty and 
utility in cumulative terms; it is only art for copyright, defined as the form of an original 
expression that meticulously delineates the model or mental image, or conveys its 
meaning by modernistic form or color181, and the invention of new ornamental designs -
as a novel idea- for patent law. Thus, the functional portions of a work shall be capable 
of being physically or conceptually separated from its artistic aspects, in order for the 
later to attract copyright protection per se as the only protectable -by copyright- 
elements. 
                                                 
178 101 U.S. 99 (1879) 
179 The subject - matter of this copyright dispute was the qualification of a book entitled "Selden's 
Condensed Ledger or Bookkeeping Simplified,", written by Charles Selden, as copyright protected; the 
book consisted of an introductory essay explaining the bookkeeping system and to which certain forms or 
banks were annexed to, further consisting of ruled lines and headings that illustrated the system and 
showed how to be used and carried out in practice. Baker then produced and published a book that 
utilized a similar system, being consequently charged for copyright infringement. Baker denied the 
complaint alleging that Selden’s work does not consist a lawful subject of copyright. 
180 It has been said that under Baker v. Selden, the idea, in effect, merges with the expression by virtue of 
the fact that there if there is “no other way to practice the accounting method without the forms”, such 
forms become essentially the idea of this method.  
181 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) 
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On the contrary, if functionality cannot be separated from the expression, the 
work becomes unprotectable “as a whole”, since “it is better to allow such copying 
rather than suffer the loss of future works that would have been developed based on 
those ideas”. However, this principle “does not mean that any and all expressions 
related, in particular, to a game rule or function are unprotectible182, and Tetris183 
constitutes an extremely interesting example. Considered as the precedent under which 
mobile games and computer programs could be effectively copyright protected, the 
reasoning behind the assessment of “Mino” game play as an infringing -to “Tetris”- work 
was based on the determination that it has copied “almost all” of Tetris’ expressive 
elements (i.e. its visual look), avoiding, as such, the “difficult task of developing its own 
take on a known idea.” In this regard, it has been stated that the “style, design, shape, 
and movement of Tetris pieces are expression, since they are neither part, nor essential, 
or inseparable from the ideas, rules, or functions of the game”. Comparing the 
audiovisual aspects of the works at issue, the court held that the underlying idea in 
“Tetris” is partially expressed through its rules, while it can be delineated by 
understanding the game at an abstract level, along with the concepts that drive the 
game184; further focusing on their particular features (the style of the pieces, the way 
they move, rotate, fall and behave, as well as the brightness, shading and gradation of 
the colors used), the court found “substantially similarity” between the two games, as 
any differences were rather “slight and insignificant”. 
                                                 
182 Since it has been stated that such an exception to copyright would likely swallow any protection one 
could possibly have, as almost all expressive elements of a game are related in some way to the rules and 
functions of game play. In this sense, idea/expression dichotomy applies, in addition, to the field of online 
and video games, consisting the basis upon which the protectable -as expressive- components of such 
game plays, defined as their aesthetic appearance will be distinguished from the non-protectable 
(functional) aspects, such as the rules of the games. .  
183 Tetris Holding, LLC v. XIO Interactive, Inc., 863 F.Supp.2d 394 (D.N.J. 2012). 
184 However, it has been argued that when the “comparison step” is circumvented -in the application of 
the “levels of abstractions” test-, protection is (inadmissibly) extended to the “intermediate levels of 
abstraction” (standing between the “most specific and highly protected level of pure expression” (within 
which the specific words, phrases, and sentences selected to convey ideas fall), and the lower level of 
unprotectable pure ideas), forbidding, as such, the production of new works which may utilize 
“substantially similar steps or organization”; as a result, if such an organization of a model’s process is 
qualified and “overprotected” as “expression”, a monopoly over an idea is “inadvertently” and improperly 
granted, removing, as such, the idea from the public domain, while suppressing simultaneously the 
progress desired in this field. McKinney, Adam, “Copyright Protection for Functional Works: Where Does 
the Fifth Circuit Draw the Line between Idea and Expression”, Baylor Law Review, Vol. 47, Issue 1, 1995, 
pp. 258-261 
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If it is not any expression related to a game rule or function that falls outside the 
scope of copyright, but only the expression which is integral or inseparable from this 
function or idea, the identification of the norm in the realm of computer programs has 
been identified as the “tangible, fixed form of an idea, whose purpose is "to convey 
information” or to transmit ideas, in one word, to communicate185; in the European 
level, the relevant definition is more extensive, declaring that “any form of expression 
which permits the reproduction of a computer program in different computer languages 
is copyright protected” (including the source code and the object code), similarly, 
though, excluding the functionality of a computer program, along with its programming 
language and the format of data files -as merely serving the exploitation of its functions- 
from the scope of copyright protection.186 
4.3 The Limited Amount of Protectable Content and a “Thin” Copyright Protection 
Implied in the measurement of the quantity of the portion taken from a copyrightable 
work for assessing liability for copyright infringement, the “de minimis rule” dictates 
that when the “appropriation of expressive elements is minimal”, such as “ordinary 
phrases and expressions conveying an idea typically expressed in a limited number of 
stereotyped fashions”, a secondary use falls within the realm of “borrowing” rather than 
“copying” the author’s expression.187 Since the “rising above the de minimis” standard 
remarks the boundaries of “substantial similarity”, copyright protection per se is 
eventually “estimated” on the basis of a “thin” or “broad” application; if a “thin” 
copyright protection is afforded, then the appropriate standard for illicit copying is 
limited to “virtual identity”. 
                                                 
185 Making, as such, a distinction between the purposes of “explanation” and “use” of an idea -according 
to the Baker reasoning-, in order to achieve a balance between the protection afforded to a “material” 
under copyright and under patent law respectively.  Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 
F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
186 Case C-406/10, SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd [2012], Judgment of 2 May 2012 (nyr) 
187 Narell v. Freeman Gp, 872 F. 2d 907 (1989). In this context, the interdependence between the 
quantitative and the qualitative aspects of a “substantial portion” has been outlined, providing that 
“quantitatively insignificant infringement may be substantial only if the material is qualitatively 
important” for both the allegedly infringed and infringing works. A similar but rather more definitive 
approach has been adopted under the United Kingdom’s case law, since it has been emphatically dictated 
that the “quantitative test” is not correct, consequently suggesting that “substantiality depends upon 
quality rather than quantity”, emphasizing, as such, on the “overall impression” that the works at issue 
display (resembling to the “total concept and feel” criterion under American case law): See n.133 
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Such a conclusion was made with regard to the (degree of) copyrightability of 
two-sentences set - up jokes which displayed an extremely limited amount of humorous 
variations188, thus based upon mere facts and elements that fall within the 
commonplace of ideas; notwithstanding the fact that (minimal) creativity and as such, 
originality were attributed to the plaintiff’s jokes, the level of substantial similarity was 
compressed to the sufficiency of “objectively virtual identity” between the works at 
issue, attracting, as such, only a “thin” copyright protection. In an inverse determination 
concerning the copyrightability of the graphic depiction of Disney characters -where 
Mickey Mouse profoundly dominated-, it has been stated that “it would be easier to 
copy substantial portions of the expression as distinguished from the idea itself of the 
Disney works, but the value of such labor-saving utility is far outweighed by the 
copyright interest in encouraging creation by protecting expression”. Moreover, both the 
quantitative and qualitative examination of Disney’s characters concluded that they are 
protected by copyright law both as literary characters, and by virtue of their distinct 
component parts. 189 It is the incapability of “observing” the plaintiff’s work into the 
secondary use by virtue of which an “incidental” or “trivial” copy that did not “steal” the 
“heart” of the copied work190 may be not actionable, since “falling within the protective 
confines of “de minimis”, in nature, use. This conclusion has been repeatedly reaffirmed 
in the relevant case law involving various types of works, such as (thumbnails of) 
photographs, television programs, advertising posters, terminology manuals, musical 
compositions and works of contemporary art, dictating that if the primary work is 
“plainly recognizable” into a secondary use, then the “de minimis” threshold is 
profoundly exceeded and a violation to copyright shall be determined.191 
 
                                                 
188 Since “similarly constrained by their subject matter and the conventions of the two-line, setup-and-
delivery paradigm”, as each joke begun with a factual sentence and then immediately concluded with 
another sentence providing humorous commentary on the preceding facts. Kaseberg v. Conaco, LLC et al, 
No. 3:2015cv01637 - Document 131 (S.D. Cal. 2017) 
189 Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972) 
190 However, it has been ruled that if short sentences or brief portions are distracted from the “core” of 
the copied work, or if they constitute a significant portion, demonstrating, in addition, particular 
originality, they might “merit protection” even if they are quantitively smallm, or even so small as a single 
word. Moran, Connor, “How Much is Too Much - Copyright Protection of Short Portions of Text in the 
United States and European Union after Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades”, Washington 
Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 6, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 248-251 
191 See n.102  
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4.4 Seeking Fairness by Limiting the Right to Exclude 
 
Since copyright creates a system of property rights, the existence and the scope of the 
entitlement afforded to copyright owners -in other words, the boundaries of exclusivity, 
consist the purpose of the distinction between idea and expression since determining 
the locus at which this crucial borderline shall be fixed. Although the core of the 
dichotomy has been clearly stated, it is considered as a standard posed and not as a 
clear rule, since the “periphery” of such barriers remains indefinite, imposing, as such, 
“significant informational burdens in a large number of unknown third-parties”192, while 
inevitably provoking uncertainty in relation to how far could a given use extend, and 
how much shall be taken from the primary work in order to be determined as a 
permitted use. For this reason, a number of restricted acts and uses of the author’s 
expression are exhaustively provided under the doctrine of exceptions and limitations193 
for the sake of public benefit, reflecting, as such, the “fair balance” sought by copyright 
law; one may argue that this fairness has been “translated” in the United States 
copyright system under the “fair use” doctrine, and in the United Kingdom copyright 
tradition under the “fair dealing” principle, where the “how much” question is 
determinatively interfering since they both refer to substantial similarity as defined by 
the amount or the part taken from a copyrighted work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
192 Liu, Joseph P., “Fair Use, Notice Failure, and the Limits of Copyright as Property”, Boston University Law 
Review, Vol. 96, Issue 3, 2016, pp.833-841 
193 Notwithstanding the fact that exceptions and limitations may be provided by member - states, 
European copyright law exhaustively indicates, in a numbered list, the specific cases within which such 
exceptions and limitations shall fall, including teaching and scientific research, reproduction by the press 
of published articles, criticism and review, and parody, caricature and pastiche. “Infosoc Directive” (article 
5).  
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4.4.1 “Fair Dealing” with Copyrighted Material: An Issue of Quality or Quantity? 
 
Considered “as old as copyright protection itself”, the doctrine of “fair dealing” -as a 
judge-made exception that was gradually transfigured in a policy-decision, codified and 
established as a statutory defense across common world-, has been considered as 
illustrating a “wise synthesis” of the rights of the author and those of the users over 
copyrighted resources, operating, as such, as a “safety valve, the function of which is to 
prevent the law of copyright from interfering unduly with the public interest” for the 
sake of “freedom of discussion”.194  Since a “permitted” infringement would be probably 
paradoxically assumed, the unauthorized, but “to a limited extent”, reproduction of a 
copyrighted work that shall fall within specifically designated, “legitimate” purposes, is, 
more accurately, conceived as a “further limitation to the limited monopoly of a 
copyright owner”.195 Simultaneously, though, it is “fair dealing” per se that is “confined” 
into specific enumerated purposes under the United Kingdom’s copyright legislation, 
designing, as such, the general framework of “intrinsically valuable activities that 
correspond to broader societal interests”196, as analogously implemented in the 
copyright laws of New Zealand197, Australia198, and Canada199.  
                                                 
194 Griffiths, Jonathan, “Fair Dealing in the Law of Copyright”, Nottingham Law Journal, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 
1999, pp. 57-58 
195 In this context, the rights of the copyright owners have been described as “not absolute”, since the 
public interest is always superseding. Puri, K. K., “Fair Dealing with Copyright Material in Australia and 
New Zealand”, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 13, Issue 3, 1983, pp. 278, 288-290 
196 Ong, Burton, “Fissures in the Facade of Fair-Dealing: Users' Rights in Works Protected by Copyright”, 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2004, Issue 1, 2004, p.160 
197 Statutory established since 1962, the 1994 Copyright Act of New Zealand, provides the acts permitted 
in relation to copyright works, establishing the “fair dealing” exception for the purposes of criticism, 
review, and news reporting “if accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement”, while the consideration of 
the “amount and substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the whole work” applies to the 
purpose of research or private study (Part 3, s.42-43).  
198 1968 Copyright Act provides (in Division 3) the non-infringing (to copyright) acts that fall within the 
realm of “fair dealing”, as designated for the purposes of research or study, criticism or review, parody or 
satire and reporting news, including also the purpose of judicial proceedings or professional advice. 
Moreover, it has been stated that the “amount and substantiality” factor shall be regarded in the cases 
where a work has been partially copied, or with regard to adaptations; focusing on the purpose of 
research or study, the “fair dealing” use only subsists if the portion taken is “reasonable”, while further 
specifically describing how much “copying” is allowed in relation to various types of works.  (s. 40-43). 
199 1985 Canadian Copyright Act provides, under the realm of exceptions to copyright, that “fair dealing 
for the purposes of research, private study, education, parody or satire does not infringe copyright”, if a 
number of acknowledgments complement the “non-commercial-user-generated” content that such uses 
shall incorporate (s.29).  
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In particular, copyright law of the United Kingdom provides for three categories 
of purposes under which a fair dealing with a work does not infringe any copyright in it: 
i) research and study, ii) criticism, review (including quotations) and news reporting, and 
iii) caricature, parody and pastiche.200 As a result, the copyist is weighed with a twofold 
burden of proof: that the “dealing” falls within one of these specific categories, and that 
such a qualified use is fair. Described as a “question of degree”, the circumstances to be 
examined and the considerations to be taken into account for the determination of 
“fairness”, relate to and rely upon the “extent and proportion of the work used” in 
relation to the primary work, and therefore, the actual use made; thus, the question is 
whether these portions were “too many and too long, to be too fair”.201  
In other words, it is the necessity (or not) to make a liberal use of a copyrighted 
material, as attached to the true purpose of the work, that will determine whether it is a 
“genuine piece” aiming to serve the purpose incorporating and illustrating, or if it is “the 
attempt to dress up the infringement of another’s copyright, and so profit unfairly from 
another’s work”. In this regard, the “fair dealing defenses” on the basis of news 
reporting exception, concerning, on the one hand, the publishing of pictures -from a 
security system of eight video films cameras- displaying Diana, Princess of Wales, and 
Dodi Al Fayed the night before they killed202, and on the other hand, of verbatim 
extracts from previously unpublished minutes of secret political203, failed since it has 
been ruled that there were respectively alternative -than infringing copyright- ways to 
display such information, and that, in the second case, the material copied was 
unjustifiably extended.  
                                                 
200 Providing that the research shall not imply any commercial purpose, and that a sufficient 
acknowledgment accompanies the secondary work. 1998 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act (s. 29-30A).  
201 Further designated by the relevant case law as the nature of the work (providing that it shall be prior to 
the secondary use published), the legitimacy of the way it was obtained, the amount taken (including 
even the entirety of a work), the (transformative) use made -similarly to the prerequisite of alterations as 
dictated by the “de minimis rule”, the commercial benefit or inversely the non-commercial purpose of the 
use, the motives and consequences of the dealing -construed as the potential effects upon the market 
that the original work addresses to-, and the possibility and capability of achieving the same result by 
other alternatives. However, if these criteria apply in hierarchical order, the market impact is considered 
as the most significant factor in the United Kingdom. D'Agostino, Gluseppina, “Healing Fair Dealing - A 
Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada's Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use”, McGill Law 
Journal, Vol. 53, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 337-344 
202 In Hyde Park Residence Limited v. Yelland & Others (2000) 
203 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd, [2001] EWCA Civ 1142; [2001] 4 All ER 666; [2001] 3 WLR 1368 
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Since the issue of “how much” -from the original work was used in the creation of a new 
work- is decisive in the determination of a “fair dealing”, the apparently identical 
prerequisite of substantiality for copyright infringement under the copyright law of the 
United Kingdom204 was distinguished from the “amount” taken for the purposes of the 
concept of defense, in the sense that under “fair dealing” even if a substantial part has 
been copied (consisting a prima facie copyright infringement), still the secondary use 
may not, in effect, violate the author’s copyright if serving one of the purposes dictated 
by the “fair dealing” doctrine.  
However, it is only “may not” and not “does not” escape liability for 
infringement; although it has been stated that “the major factor in determining the 
question of substantiality is the quality of what is taken in relation to the work as a 
whole, rather than the quantity”205,  the amount of the portion taken, as proportionally 
calculated, weighs -in equal terms with its value- against the finding of a fair dealing206; 
as one may argue, it is an implicit reference and application of the “de minimis” doctrine 
as interfering in the investigation of the real objective of a challenging “dealing”, and 
which, eventually, constitutes the most determinative factor that eventually prevails 
substantiality, either qualitatively and/or quantitatively assessed.207   
                                                 
204 1998 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act explicitly designates both the authors’ exclusive rights, as well 
as the acts infringing copyright, further stating that the restricted -by copyright- acts, relate to a 
copyrighted work either as a whole, or in any substantial part of it (s.16(3). In other words, a copyright 
owner is protected from any unauthorized or unlicensed (re)production of his work from third - parties, in 
relation either to his work or to any substantial part thereof. However, it has been said that focusing on 
the proviso as such, the “true objective of historical British copyright law” is omitted, since aiming to 
reach a balance between the authors’ rights and those of general public; this aim has been signified by the 
judicial formulation of “fair dealing” -under which the authors’ rights are “subject to the limits of public 
interest”, even before its establishment and gradual evolution as a statutory defense. See n.87, pp. 314-
315, 326-327 
205 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273, 276 [H.L.] 
206 Hubbard v. Vosper stated that “the passages which have been taken from these various works are so 
substantial, quantitatively so great in relation to the respective works from which the citations are taken, 
that they fall outside the scope of “fair dealing”: [1971] EWCA Civ J1119-1, [1972] 2 QB 84 
207 Described as a landmark decision in the adjudication of “fair dealing” defense, “Clockwork Orange” 
case (Time Warner Entertainments Company LP v. Channel 4 Television Corporation plc and another [1994] 
EMLR 1 (CA)) stated that a documentary program taking and displaying more than 12 per cent of the 
original film (amounting to a 40% of the secondary use) could fall within the scope of “fair dealing”, 
notwithstanding the fact that the “average person would be hardly pressed to say that such a use from 
the plaintiff’s film had been “fair””. Bradshaw, David, “Fair Dealing as a Defence to Copyright Infringement 
in UK Law: An Historical Excursion from 1802 to the Clockwork Orange Case 1993”, Denning Law Journal, 
Vol. 10, 1995 
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4.4.2 Conciliating Copyright and Freedom of Expression: The “Fair Use” Doctrine 
If “fair dealing” is considered as conferring upon the users of a copyrightable work an 
“additional protection”, the doctrine of “fair use"208 has been described as a “privilege in 
others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by 
the copyright".209 Consisting an affirmative defense to copyright infringement which (if 
succeeding) reverses the assessment of “infringing” with the qualification of 
“permitted” -as a “fair”- use under the law, it has been described as the constitutional 
imperative of the right to access that limits the rights of the copyright owner over an 
original copyrighted work.210  
Considered as distinguishing the use of a copyright from the use of the work 
itself, as respectively reflecting the author’s exclusivity and the right of the public to 
access copyrighted resources, the statutory codification of the “fair use” doctrine is 
regarded as implementing the compromising character of copyright per se. In this 
context, the lack of the author’s prior consent shall not be construed as circumventing 
the legal monopoly granted under copyright law, but as necessarily restricting it in order 
to achieve the appropriate balance with the public interest.211 Encompassing, as such, 
both the “purpose” and the “function” of copyright law, the doctrine’s statutory 
codification provides for an “non-exhaustive list of purposes -such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching or research”- combined with a seemingly exhaustive 
list of factors” that shall be considered by courts on a case-by-case analysis”.212  
 
                                                 
208 Similarly originating in the courtrooms “dating back nearly to the birth of copyright in the eighteenth 
century”. Smith, Gordon V. and Parr, Russell L., “Intellectual Property: Valuation, Exploitation, and 
Infringement Damages”, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2005, p.744 
209 Denicola, Robert C., “Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction 
Literary Works”, Art & the Law, Vol. 6, Issue 4, 1980-1981, p.98 
210 Since to the extent that a work is not original, or to the extent that it falls within the public domain, it is 
“free for all to use without limitation”. Birch, Stanley F., “Copyright Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative”, 
Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Vol. 54, Issues 2-3, 2007, pp. 156-160 
211 In this context, the author’s consent is not actually disregarded but presumed by the law, consisting, as 
such, an implied authorization in relation only to reasonable and customary uses of a copyrighted work, 
under the “constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts”. In Harper & 
Row: See n.179 
212 See n.110, p.314 
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This specified and numbered list includes the “purpose and character of the use” 
-described as the “heart” of the fair use inquiry-, the “nature of the copyrighted work”, 
the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole”, and the “effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copy” 213 -considered as the “most important consideration”-. Focusing on the “amount 
and substantiality” factor, it has been said that it does not merely rely upon a 
quantitative measurement -described as paradoxically “weighing intangibles”-, but it is 
inexorably intertwined with the significance of the material taken in qualitative terms on 
the basis of a “careful balance” sought between the “value” and “quantity” of the 
materials used in relation to the purpose of the copying; in this context, the copying of 
353 pages of President Washington’s personal and official papers published in a two-
volume work was not qualified as a fair use. 214 Indeed, a differentiated approach would 
“overemphasize” the importance of this mere factor “as a whole”215, contradicting, as 
such, with the profound determination that “the four statutory factors (may) not be 
treated in isolation, one from another”, but they are “all to be explored and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”. This principle was reaffirmed in 
a case concerning the "Niagara" painting by the contemporary artist Jeff Koons, 
consisted of fragmentary images collaged against the backdrop of a landscape; one of 
these images was adapted by a photograph taken from the plaintiff Andrea Blanch. 
Since there were only some elements copied from the original work and incorporated in 
the artist’s collage, which have been further substantially modified, the secondary work 
was qualified as a transformative use, allowed under the “fair use” doctrine, since, inter 
alia, the objectives sought by the two authors were determined as “sharply 
different”.216 
                                                 
213 Further providing that “the fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors”. 1976 Copyright Act, §107 
214 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
215 Despite the characterization of such quantitative measurements as a “temptation” or “trap” within 
which the courts fall, it has been suggested that the “amount and substantiality” factor, as closely 
interconnected with the “market effect” consideration, could set the “suitable standard” sought for the 
determination of the amount taken, if transfigured to the decisive question that shall be posed of “how 
much importance the potential audience for the underlying work would attach to the portions of that 
work that its users borrowed”. Dratler, Jay Jr., “Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law”, 
University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 43, Issue 2, 1988, pp. 309-312 
216 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) 
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Notwithstanding the consensus on the qualitative, rather quantitative nature of the 
statutory inquiry, the extent of the copied material is, inter alia, counted in the fair-use 
analysis, implying, as such, a factual comparison217 or a “functional distinction” of the 
works in question, as aligned with the pivotal definition of what actually constitutes an 
“invasion of the plaintiff’s market”218. Respectively, the use of aspects of “Harry Potter” 
novels for the creation and distribution of an encyclopedia-like guide for the series, was 
not qualified as a “fair use”, since, inter alia, the defendants took more of the 
copyrighted works that was “reasonably necessary” in relation to the book’s purpose as 
a reference guide219; similarly, a “fair use” concerning the posting on Georgia State 
University’s system of unlicensed portions of Cambridge University Press and other 
publishing houses’ works, for students to obtain them electronically, was found as an 
erroneous finding and continuing misuse of the defense, providing that the amount 
copied shall be measured in relation to the length of the primary work on a work-by-
work basis, thus examining each excerpt individually in order to determine if it consisted 
a “reasonable” copy with regard to the aim pursued.220 
                                                 
217 Concerning the material copied and the relevant paraphrases made from various articles as 
incorporated in a biography, it has been stated that the justification of a “fair use” as applied in particular 
materials, requires the identification of their own nature; in this regard, it was found that an historical or 
biographical work consists -by nature- a “valuable source for future biographers, historians or social 
scientists”, because of the public benefit to encourage the development and distribution of such works. In 
this sense, the interests of the copyright holder must be occasionally subordinated to the greater public 
interest, and the finding of “fair use” was “replaced” by a comparison of the works at issue, examining the 
issues of commercial gain, public interest, and independent research. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiff-
appellee, v. Random House, Inc. and John Keats, Defendants-appellants, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) 
218 Considering that copyright per se is, after all, about competition, thus regulating “fair competition in 
the marketplace” as a “known quantity”, consisting an extensively harmonized concept (at least, in the 
European level), in contrast with the seemingly legal uncertainty that traverses unfair competition law, 
the concern on the status of a secondary use and its impact on the primary market becomes an issue of 
prime significance. Kamperman Sanders, Anselm, “Do Whiffs of Misappropriation and Standards for 
Slavish Imitation Weaken the Foundations of IP Law?”, in “Research Handbook on the Future of EU 
Copyright”, Derclaye, Estelle (Ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 2009, pp. 568-569; in this context, it has 
been said that the three major factors which justify the doctrine of “fair use”, namely its constitutional 
basis, the economic benefit (or potential damages) and the functional distinction between the works at 
issue, are segregated in the crucial (and decisive) question on whether does the secondary use lays in a 
“position of competition” with the primary work, and whether does the copy supersede the original. 
Holbrook, Lanny R., “Copyright Infringement and Fair Use”, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 40, 
Issue 3, 1971, pp. 534-547 
219 Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Reaching the same 
result, Harper & Row (See n.179) found that the portion used was neither inappropriate or too extensive 
“for the favored purpose of news reporting”. 
220 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014) 
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Beyond, though, its interconnection with the third statutory factor of the “market 
effect”221, the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and in particular, its 
reasonable and necessary (or not) extent -as explicitly provided with regard to the 
unauthorized use, by Google, of 170 lines of Java applications that was found as 
“technically necessary” for the use of the relevant code, qualified, as such, as a 
permitted copying222-, is inexorably intertwined with the purpose and the character of 
the secondary use, shifting, as such, the emphasis from the qualitative and quantitative 
composition of a work to its “transformative value”; a criterion that would eventually 
prevail even the copying of the “heart” of a work. In the end, if “parody exception” 
constitutes a right to parody deriving from the freedom of expression223, and if 
appropriation art -as the two most prominent “fair uses” that rely upon the “heart” of a 
copyrighted work-  is about “borrowing” (for the purposes of new creations) rather than 
“stealing”, how much is allowed to be taken? 
If a work has been copied in its entirety, we might think that it precludes the 
finding of a “fair use”; yet, it does not, still though, a wholescale copying certainly 
militates against such a conclusion224, demonstrating, as such, the divergency of the 
doctrine with the rule of “substantial similarities” which requires proof of copying. 
 
 
                                                 
221 Defined as the usurpation of the demand for the protected work, thus operating as a “market 
substitute for the original or any potentially licensed derivative”: in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (92-
1292), 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In this regard, the sufficiency and substantiality of the material copied have 
been regarded as harming, in effect, the “fair market value” of the original work, depriving, as such, its 
author not only from the fee he was entitled to exact of this particular use, but also from any 
compensation he would, otherwise, receive”. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, Second Circuit (2001) 
222 Centering upon the copyrightability of Java applications, developed and owned by Oracle but used -
without a prior authorization- by Google for the creation of Android smartphone operating system, the 
court ruled that the finding of a “fair use” is supported only if the extent of the copyrighted material used 
(by Google) was the necessary to write in the Java language; if it exceeds the necessary one, then the use 
is not fair. Oracle v Google, Case 3:10-cv-03561-WHA (2016) 
223 Originating from the Greek word “parodeia”, the concept of parody has been defined as “referring” to 
previous works, borrowing or adapting its elements under the context of satire. In the EU level, it has 
been qualified as an indisputably appropriate way to express an opinion, further requiring evoking an 
existing work while being noticeably different from it, and, constituting an expression of humor or 
mockery: Case C-201/13 Deckmyn and VZW Vrijheidsfonds v. Vandersteen a.o., judgment of 3 September 
2014.  
224 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); College Entrance Examination Bd. v. Pataki, 
889 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.N.Y 1995. 
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However, within the framework of “fair use”, the similarities are neither to be found, 
nor disputed; they are admittedly present, but they allegedly fall within an intended 
purpose that may justify this similarity (or even an identical duplication). In this regard, 
the abduction of the “heart” of the “Oh, Pretty Woman” song was qualified as a fair use 
on the basis of parody, since “that heart is what most readily conjures up the song for 
parody, and it is the heart at which parody takes aim”225; moreover, a “far more than 
merely a de minimis taking” was not found as violating copyright, even if it was the 
“heart” of the original musical composition taken226, while a great deal copied from the 
plaintiff’s original video was determined as “plainly necessary and reasonable in order to 
accomplish the transformative purpose of critical commentary”.227  
Moreover, if what is critical is the “proportion of the original work used, and not 
how much of the secondary work comprises the original”, the “transformation” and 
“alteration” of classic portraits of Rastafarians in Jamaica with a new expression, found 
to display an entirely different aesthetic and a dissimilar character, resulting, as such, to 
“distinctive creative and communicative results”, consisted a (rather paradoxical) 
determination of a “fair use”.228 On the contrary, an alleged spoof of parody of the 
famed novel “Gone With The Wind” failed, since the extent to which the defendants 
have drawn on the copyrighted work was far more extensive from what is permissible to 
conjure up the subjects or characters parodied.229 Nonetheless, if any transformation 
amounts to a permitted -by the law-adaptation of the original work, could ever such an 
interference (or invasion) to copyright, “touch” the core of a copyrighted work, namely 
the author’s own expression? 
                                                 
225 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music: See n.221 
226 Elsmere Music Inc., v National Broadcasting Company Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741 (U.S. Dist. 1980) 
227 Matt Hosseinzadeh v. Ethan Klein and Hila Klein No. 16-CV-3081 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017) 
228 Cariou v. Prince (714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013). Implying some rather unusual aesthetic, economic or 
related to prestige considerations, the court held that the crucial line of the “market effect” shall be 
drawn on whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original work, and such an usurpation is 
only possible when the infringer's target audience and the nature of the infringing content is the same as 
the original. In the case at issue, the court stated that Prince's target audience is very different from 
Cariou's, and moreover, that there is “no evidence that Prince's work ever touched -much less usurped- 
either the primary or derivative market for Cariou's work”. 
229 As the court dictated that “it is not the sort of original critical comment meant to be protected by the 
fair use defense, but rather a predominantly derivative or adaptive use of the copyrighted film and novel 
“Gone With The Wind”. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., v Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc., 
479 F. Supp. 351 (U.S. Dist. 1979) 
   
  -67- 
In Rogers v. Koons230, the court demonstrated that ideas and concepts “found in the 
common domain are the inheritance of everyone”. What is protected is the original or 
unique way that an author expresses those ideas, concepts, principles or processes. 
Thus, the focus must be on the similarity of the expression of an idea or fact, not on the 
similarity of the facts, ideas or concepts themselves. The court held that Koons did not 
copy the idea but used the identical expression of the idea that Rogers created, thus 
copying “nearly in toto” the essence of the Rogers’ “Puppies” photograph. Moreover, 
insofar as the subsequent work (the "String of Puppies" sculpture) was not qualified as a 
parody, it was stated that “beyond the factual subject - matter of the photograph”, it 
was the “very expression” of the original work that was incorporated in the sculpture, 
deducing that “no reasonable jury could conclude that Koons did not exceed a 
permissible level of copying under the fair use doctrine”.  
Again, Koon’s identical copying of a Garfield comic character was “so obvious 
that no reasonable factfinder could conclude otherwise”, consisting, as such, a virtual 
and exact reproduction of both the appearance and expression of the original work.231 In 
2017, a French Court found that the Koon’s “Naked” sculpture infringed the legitimate 
owner’s copyright over the original photograph, thus counterfeiting its “atmosphere of 
kindness and purity that shows the imprint of the author’s personality”.232  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
230 960 F. 2d 301 (1992)  
231 United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Jeff Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (1993) 
232 in examining the differences and similarities between the allegedly infringed and infringing work, the 
court held that in Koon’s sculpture one could “recognize and identify the models and the pose chosen by 
the photographer”, which therefore consist “essential components” of the copyrighted work. Bauret v. 
Koons, Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (3e ch. 4e sect.), 9 mars 2017, Consorts Bauret c/ J. Koons, 
société Jeff Koons, Centre national d'art et de culture G. Pompidou, No. 15/01086.) 
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On the contrary, in a case concerning the appropriation of the unique attributes of 
“Superman”, the court found that the allegedly infringing work indeed copied elements 
which are uniquely associated with the original character rather than with the idea of a 
superhero in general. Nonetheless, comparing the two works at issue, they were found 
so different that “substantial similarity” was precluded, and in any case, the secondary 
work fell within the “fair use” realm as a parody. Still though, the court declared that the 
plaintiffs' copyrights “do not entitle them to protection of the idea of a character with 
superhuman powers who battles the forces of evil”, and as a result, what must be 
shown is that the “concrete expression of the Superman idea has been appropriated”.233  
Ultimately, it has been concluded that it would be “convenient” to define a “fair 
use” by simply saying that “others may “copy” the “theme”, or “ideas”, or the “like”, of 
a work, though not its expression”. In this regard, the similarities between the allegedly 
infringed play and the infringing picture have been stated in detail, in order to decide 
whether the limits of “fair use” have been crossed or not234. Declaring that “no plagiarist 
can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate”, the court 
held that the dramatic significance of the scenes of the works at issue was the same, 
almost to the letter. What we shall always remember is that even if a “second comer” is 
entitled to use not only all that had gone before, but even the plaintiffs' contribution 
itself, there is a fundamental line drawn therein. He has the right to draw from the 
original work only the more general patterns; that is, that any second comer’s 
interference and interaction with a copyrighted work shall always keep clear of its 
"expression”.235 
 
                                                 
233 Warner Bros. Inc., v. American Broadcasting Companies Inc., & Ors, 523 F. Supp. 611 (U.S. Dist. 1981) 
234 The court proceeded to parallel step-by-step and scene-by-scene examinations of the works at issue, 
stating that “in its broader outline a plot is never copyrightable, for it is plain beyond peradventure that 
anticipation as such cannot invalidate a copyright”. Although reaffirming that a play may be pirated 
without using the dialogue, and as such, there would not be a piracy in a pantomime since there cannot 
be -by nature of the work- any dialogue, the court held that a pantomime constitutes a “drama” since a 
play may lapse into a pantomime again and again “at its most poignant and significant moments”; indeed, 
a nod, a movement of the hand, a pause, “may tell the audience more than words could tell”. Concluding, 
it has been declared that “if the picture was not an infringement of the play, there can be none short of 
taking the dialogue”. 
235 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936) 
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EPILOGUE 
It seems that copyright law had to “shoulder” the whole burden of constructing, 
formulating and regulating the interface between Law, Art and Economy; a “symbiosis” 
vibrated by complexity, divergency and as such, inconsistency due to the differentiated 
policies, approaches, aims and scopes, as infused into the law of copyright. But even if 
we are all different, we are all the same, and copyright uniquely and generously 
encompasses our continuously changeable and even unpredictable needs and demands, 
both as individuals and as members of society, intended to strike a fair balance between 
our opposing or competing rights and interests. In this sense, idea/expression 
dichotomy is not only the “heart” of copyright law; it is the manifestation of its 
humanitarian character and nature. If targeted as irrelevant or inappropriate, copyright 
law per se is victimized, and the fundamental principles on which our existence per se is 
rooted, is doubted.  
From originality as the sole prerequisite for the qualification of the author’s 
expression, to substantial similarity between the expressive components of a 
copyrighted work and its unlawful (or not) repetition, and from the principles of quality 
to quantity of the portion taken as the decisive criteria for the assessment of copyright 
infringement to their exceptions, the contradiction on the results achieved is a risk that 
copyright consciously decided to undertake, since committed itself to respect and 
encompass our differences as reflected into the law, despite the onus and the duty that 
consequently fell on it. In any case, it is not a fault. Deepening, though, even on these 
undoubted diversities and the outcomes deriving from their implementation, the 
rationale behind them and the aim pursued were inherently the same; the need to draw 
a line between the right and its violation. Notwithstanding the extensive or restricted 
barriers imposed, the “terra” preserved was always the author’s individuality and 
uniqueness, as celebrated through the expression of his own self.  
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Copyright counted on our fair interaction. And it did not disappoint us, but we rather 
sidelined, disregarded, or at least, misunderstood the law and the essence of copyright. 
The current (and any) debate relies on our expectation, our need or even demand to 
assert more freedom, and copyright is perceived as “favoring” either the “one” or the 
“whole of us”. However, it does not. It protects equally both. And the line drawn is a line 
of reciprocal limitations in order to achieve harmony and symmetry. Indisputably, 
copyright needs to change. But this does not mean that it should be circumvented. It 
only needs to remind its own scope, depth, and edges, as signified by the dichotomy 
between an idea and its expression. And as such, it will be comprehended, and 
eventually reinvented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  -71- 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS 
Athanasopoulos, Evangelos Sp., ““The Idea/Expression Dichotomy”: A comparative 
study of the "idea/expression dichotomy" under the U.S. Copyright Act and the N. 
2121/1993”, Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2017 
Burell, Robert and Coleman Allison, “Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact”, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005 
D'Agostino, Gluseppina, “Healing Fair Dealing - A Comparative Copyright Analysis of 
Canada's Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use”, McGill Law Journal, Vol. 53, 
Issue 2, 2008 
Davies, Colin and Cheng, Tania, “Intellectual Property Law in the United Kingdom”, 
Kluwer Law International, 2011 
Derclaye, Estelle, “Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright”, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Inc., 2009 
Eliot, Thomas, Stearns, “The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism: Main 
Edition”, Faber & Faber, 1997 
Gervais, Daniel J., “Restructuring Copyright: A Comprehensive Path to International 
Copyright Reform” (Elgar Monographs in Intellectual Property Law), Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017 
Goldstein, Paul, “International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice”, Oxford 
University Press, 2001 
Kearns, Paul, “Freedom of Artistic Expression: Essays on Culture and Legal Censure”, 
Hart Publishing, 2013 
Kleon, Austin, “Steal Like an Artist: 10 Things Nobody Told You About Being Creative”, 
Key Books, 2013 
Koumantos, George, “Pneumatiki Idioktisia: 8th Edition”, Sakkoulas Ant. Ν., 2002 
Netanel, Neil Weinstock, “Copyright’s Paradox”, Oxford University Press, 2008 
Pike, Christopher G., “Virtual Monopoly: Building an Intellectual Property Strategy for 
Creative Advantage--From Patents to Trademarks, From Copyrights to Design Rights”, 
Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2001 
   
  -72- 
Rosenmeier, Morten and Teilmann, Stina, “Art and Law: The Copyright Debate”, DJØF 
Publishing, 2005 
Sherman, Brad and Bently, Lionel, “The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: 
The British Experience, 1760 – 1911”, Cambridge University Press, 1999 
Smith, Gordon V. and Parr, Russell L., “Intellectual Property: Valuation, Exploitation, 
and Infringement Damages”, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2005 
Stamatoudi, Irini, “Copyright and the Digital Agenda for Europe: Current Regulations 
and Challenges for the Future”, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens - Thessaloniki, P.N. 
Sakkoulas, 2015 
Stamatoudi, Irini and Torremans, Paul, “EU Copyright Law: A Commentary”, Edward 
Elgar Publishing: Elgar Commentaries Series, 2014 
Stamatoudi, Irini and Koumatos, George, “Greek Copyright Law”, P. Sakkoulas Editions, 
Athens, 2014 
Stamatoudi, Irini, Copyright and Multimedia Products, A Comparative Analysis, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001 
Stokes, Simon, “Digital Copyright: Law and Practice”, 4th edition, Hart Publishing, 2014 
Stokes, Simon, “Art and Copyright: Second Edition”, Hart Publishing, 2012 
Torremans, Paul, “Research Handbook on Copyright Law: Second Edition”, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham (UK) - Northampton (US), 2017 
Torremans, Paul, “Copyright Law: A Handbook of Contemporary Research”, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2007 
Vaver, David and Bently, Bionel, “Intellectual Property and the New Millennium: Essays 
in Honour of William R. Cornish”, Cambridge University Press, 2004 
Vaidhyanathan, Siva, “Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and 
How it Threatens Creativity”, New York University Press, 2001 
Xu, Ting and Allain, Jean, “Property and Human Rights in a Global Context” (Human 
Rights Law in Perspective), Hart Publishing, 2016 
 
 
   
  -73- 
ARTICLES 
Abrams, Howard B., “Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law”, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 55, Issue 2, 1992 
Adeney, Elizabeth, “Authorship and Fixation in Copyright Law: A Comparative 
Comment”, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 35, Issue 2, 2011 
Birch, Stanley F., “Copyright Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative”, Journal of the 
Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Vol. 54, Issues 2-3, 2007 
Bradshaw, David, “Fair Dealing as a Defence to Copyright Infringement in UK Law: An 
Historical Excursion from 1802 to the Clockwork Orange Case 1993”, Denning Law 
Journal, Vol. 10, 1995 
Brenner, Lee S. and Rohrer, Allison S., “The De Minimis Doctrine: How Much Copying Is 
Too Much”, Communications Lawyer, Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2006 
Buccafusco, Christopher, “A Theory of Copyright Authorship”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 
102, Issue 5, 2016 
Burk, Dan L., “Expression, Selection, Abstraction: Copyright' s Golden Braid”, Syracuse 
Law Review, Vol. 55, Issue 3, 2005 
Cross, John T. and Yu, Peter K., “Competition Law and Copyright Misuse”, Drake Law 
Review, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2008 
Demos, Raphael, “Note on Plato's Theory of Ideas”, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1948 
Denicola, Robert C., “Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of 
Nonfiction Literary Works”, Art & the Law, Vol. 6, Issue 4, 1980-1981 
Drassinower, Abraham, “What's Wrong with Copying?”, Harvard University Press, 2015 
Drassinower, Abraham, “From Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of 
Balance in Copyright Law”, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 34, Issue 4, 2009 
Drassinower, Abraham, “Capturing Ideas: Copyright and the Law of First Possession”, 
Cleveland State Law Review, Volume 54, Issue 191, 2006 
Drassinower, Abraham, “A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in 
Copyright Law”, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. XVI, No.l, 2003 
Dratler, Jay Jr., “Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law”, University of 
Miami Law Review, Vol. 43, Issue 2, 1988 
   
  -74- 
Eland, Stephen H., “The Abstraction-Filtration Test: Determining Non-Literal Copyright 
Protection for Software”, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Issue 3, 1994 
Foster, Robert W., “International Copyright Protection”, South Carolina Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1950 
Garfield, Alan, “Copyright Law's Delicate Balancing Act”, Delaware Lawyer, Vol. 35, Issue 
3, 2017 
Gervais, Daniel, “Fair Use, Fair Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts to Conceptualize 
Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright”, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., 
Vol. 57, Issue 3, 2010 
Gervais, Daniel J., “Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright 
Exceptions and Limitations”, University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, Vol. 5, 
2008 
Griffiths, Jonathan, “The “'Three-Step Test” in European Copyright Law - Problems and 
Solutions”, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 31/2009 
Griffiths, Jonathan, “Fair Dealing in the Law of Copyright”, Nottingham Law Journal, Vol. 
8, Issue 1, 1999 
Hugenholtz, P. Bernt, “Copyright in Europe: Twenty Years Ago, Today and What the 
Future Holds”, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 
23, Issue 2, 2013. 
Holbrook, Lanny R., “Copyright Infingement and Fair Use”, University of Cincinnati Law 
Review, Vol. 40, Issue 3, 1971 
Horwitz, Lester, “Copyright Law - Rights in Ideas”, University of Kansas City Law Review, 
Vol. 24, Issue 4, 1955-1956 
Jain, Sankalp, “The Principle of Idea-Expression Dichotomy: A Comparative Study of US, 
UK & Indian Jurisdictions”, 2012, online available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2229628 
Jones, Richard, “The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law”, Pace 
Law Review, Volume 10, Issue 3, 1990 
Khong, Dennis W. K., “Copyright Doctrines, Abstraction and Court Error”, Review of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 2007 
Kurtz, Leslie A., “Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright”, 47 U. Miami 
L. Rev. 1221, 1993 
   
  -75- 
Liu, Joseph P., “Fair Use, Notice Failure, and the Limits of Copyright as Property”, Boston 
University Law Review, Vol. 96, Issue 3, 2016 
Liu, Adrian, “Copyright as Quasi-Public Property: Reinterpreting the Conflict between 
Copyright and the First Amendment”, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2008 
Levine, Arthur, “The End of Formalities: No More Second-Class Copyright Owners”, 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 1995 
Loren, Lydia Pallas, “Fixation as Notice in Copyright Law”, Boston University Law 
Review, Vol. 96, Issue 3, 2016 
Manning, Colin, “English & Continental Tests of Originality: Labour, Skill, and Judgement 
versus Creations of the Mind”, 2016, online available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2782052 
Marke, Julius J., “Copyright and Intellectual Property” Albany Law Review, Vol. 32, Issue 
1, 1967 
Martyniuk, Andrew O., “Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Analysis and the Narrowing 
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs”, University of Cincinnati Law 
Review, Vol. 63, Issue 3, 1995 
Mason, Anthony, “Public-Interest Objectives and the Law of Copyright”, Journal of Law 
and Information Science, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 1998 
Masters, Robert M., DeFosse, Jonathan R., Cremen, Timothy P. and Ryan, Kevin A., 
“Intellectual Property Outlook: Cases and Trends to Follow in 2018”, 2018 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, “Copyright, 
Competition and Development”, Munich, 2013 
McKinney, Adam, “Copyright Protection for Functional Works: Where Does the Fifth 
Circuit Draw the Line between Idea and Expression”, Baylor Law Review, Vol. 47, Issue 1, 
1995 
Merrill, Thomas W., “Property and the Right to Exclude”, Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 77, 
Issue 4, Article 7, 1998, online available at: 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1492&context=nlr 
Moran, Connor, “How Much is Too Much - Copyright Protection of Short Portions of 
Text in the United States and European Union after Infopaq International A/S v. Danske 
Dagblades”, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 6, Issue 3, 2011 
Mossoff, Adam, “Is Copyright Property”, San Diego Law Review, Vol. 42, Issue 1, 2005 
   
  -76- 
Murray, Michael D., “Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scenes a Faire and 
Merger Doctrines for Visual Works”, Baylor Law Review, Vol. 58, Issue 3, 2006 
Nimmer, Melville B, “Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 17, Issue 6, 1970 
Ong, Burton, “Fissures in the Facade of Fair-Dealing: Users' Rights in Works Protected by 
Copyright”, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2004, Issue 1, 2004 
Patry, William, “Limitations and Exceptions in the Digital Era”, Indian Journal of Law and 
Technology, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 2011 
Perlmutter, Shira, “Freeing Copyright from Formalities”, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment 
Law Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 1995 
Peters, Marybeth, “Copyright Enters the Public Domain”, Journal of the Copyright 
Society of the U.S.A., Vol. 51, Issue 4, 2004 
Piotraut, Jean-Luc, “An Author's Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality 
of French and American Law Compared”, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 
Vol. 24, Issue 2, 2006 
Puri, K. K., “Fair Dealing with Copyright Material in Australia and New Zealand”, Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 13, Issue 3, 1983 
Rahmatian, Andreas, “Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labour” 
Doctrine Under Pressure”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2013 
Reznick, Allan E., “Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.: Copyright 
Protection for Computer Formats and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy”, Rutgers 
Computer & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 1980 
Rice, David A., “Copyright as Talisman: Expanding 'Property' in Digital Works”, 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, Volume 16, 2002 
Rosati, Eleonora, “Illusions Perdues – The Idea/Expression Dichotomy at Crossroads”, 
Annual Conference of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI), 
Berkeley (CA), 2009 
Ruiz, Nicholas, “Copyright's Paradox: The Public Interest and Private Monopoly”, 
Intellectual Property Law Bulletin, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2014 
Sag, Matthew J., “Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and 
Doctrinal Efficiency”, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 81, Issue 1, 2006 
   
  -77- 
Samuels, Edward, “The Idea-Expression dichotomy in Copyright Law”, Tennessee Law 
Review, Vol. 56, Issue 321, 1989 
Samuelson, Pamela, “A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement”, 
Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 107, Issue 4, 2013 
Selsky, Eileen L., “Is Copyright a Property Right or a Creation of Statute”, Entertainment 
and Sports Law Journal, Volume 2, 1984 
Solmsen, Friedrich, “Plato and the Concept of the Soul (Psyche): Some Historical 
Perspectives”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 44, No.3, 1983 
Stamatoudi, Irini, “Are Sophisticated Multimedia Works Comparable to Video Games?”, 
Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Vol. 48, Issue 3, 2001 
Stanton, Laurence A., “Expression and Originality in Copyright Law”, Washburn Law 
Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1972 
Wallace, Rachael, “Framing the Issue: Avoiding a Substantial Similarity Finding in 
Reproduced Visual Art”, Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Volume 10, 
Issue 2, 2014 
Walker, Robert Kirk and Depoorter, Ben, “Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in 
Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard”, Northwestern University Law 
Review, Vol. 109, No.2, 2015 
Wei, George, “Certainty of Subject-Matter in the Development of Intellectual Property: 
Please Sir, I Want Some More”, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2009, Issue 2, 
2009 
Wengraf, Andrew, “Property in Ideas”, Legal Studies Forum, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 1989 
Wilde, Edward C, “Replacing the Idea/Expression Metaphor with a Market-Based 
Analysis in Copyright Infringement Actions”, Whittier Law Review, Vol. 16, Issue 3, 1995 
Yen, Alfred C., “The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory”, Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 2, 1992 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  -78- 
TABLE OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
2001/29/EC Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society 
2009/24/EC Directive on the legal protection of computer programs 
2006/115/EC Directive on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to 
copyright in the field of intellectual property  
2006/116/EC Directive on the term of protection of copyright and certain related right 
96/9/EC Directive on the legal protection of databases  
1952 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
1976 U.S. Copyright Act  
First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Constitution of Greece 
Greek Law No.2121/1993 on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters United 
Kingdom: 1998 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
Ireland: 2000 Copyright and Related Rights 
Australia: 1968 Copyright Act 
French Intellectual Property Code (consolidated version of March 17, 2017) 
Canada: Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 
Czech Republic: 2000 Copyright Act 
New Zealand: 1994 Copyright Act 
 
   
  -79- 
TABLE OF CASES 
GREECE 
Court of Appeals, Athens, Decisions No. 5190/2014, No. 2648/2010, No. 6193/2006,  
No. 2969/2012, No. 2932/2006 
Court of Appeals, Thessaloniki, Decision No. 1929/2007 
Court of First Instance (Multimember Panel), Athens, Decision No. 1701/2015 
Court of First Instance (Multimember Panel), Ioannina, Decision No. 134/2013 
 
COURT OF JUSTICTE OF EUROPEAN UNION 
Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009], judgment 
of 16 July 2009, ECR I-656 
Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Karen 
Murphy [2011], judgment of 4 October 2011, ECR I-9083 
Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH and others [2013], judgment 
of 7 March 2013 (nyr) 
Case C-604/10, Football Dataco Ltd and Others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and Others [2012], 
Judgment of 1 March 2012 (nyr) 
Case 277/10 Martin Luksan v. Petrus van der Let [2012], judgment of 9 February 2012, 
ECDR 5 
Case 238/87 Volvo v. Veng [1988], judgment of 5th October 1988, ECR 6211 
Case C-201/13 Deckmyn v. Vandersteen [2014], judgment of 3 September 2014 
Case C-406/10, SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd [2012], Judgment of 2 May 
2012 (nyr) 
 
 
 
 
   
  -80- 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Designers Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (t/a Washington DC), (2000) F.S.R. 
121 
Brighton & Anor v. Jones [2004] EWHC 1157 (Ch) 
Tate v. Thomas [1921] 1 Ch 503 
Martin & Anor v Kogan & Ors [2017] EWHC 2927 (IPEC) 
Robin Ray v. Classic FM plc [1998] FSR 622 
Ravenscroft v. Herbert and New English Library Ltd. [ 1980] R.P.C. 193 (Ch. D.) 
Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd, [2001] EWCA Civ 1142; [2001] 4 All ER 666; [2001] 3 
WLR 1368 
Hyde Park Residence Limited v. Yelland & Others (2000) 
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273, 276 [H.L.] 
Hubbard v. Vosper [1971] EWCA Civ J1119-1, [1972] 2 QB 84 
Time Warner Entertainments Company LP v. Channel 4 Television Corporation plc and 
another [1994] EMLR 1 (CA) 
Hollinranke v. Truswell, 3 Ch. 420 (1894) 
 
UNITED STATES 
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) 
Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992) 
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp v. Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738 (1971) 
Consumers Union Inc. v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 199 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961) 
Davis v. United Artists Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996) 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211, 
1918 U.S. 
   
  -81- 
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) 
Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (1955) 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936) 
Mattel, Inc. v Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983) 
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976) 
Gates Rubber Company v. Bando Chemical Industries Limited Usa R, 9 F.3d 823 (1993) 
Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996) 
Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239-40 (2d Cir.1983) 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S.Ct. 460, 470, 98 L.Ed. 630, 642 (1954) 
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 
S.Ct. 2278, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986 
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 1977) 
Golan v. Holder, 181 L.Ed.2d 835, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) 
Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1979) 
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) 
Universal Athletic Sales Co v. Salkeld E Pinchock, 511 F. 2d 904 (1975) 
Musto v. Mayer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
Giangrasso v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
Atari Inc v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp, 672 F. 2d 607 (1982) 
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 124 USPQ 154 (1960) 
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music 905 F. 2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990) 
   
  -82- 
Narell v. Freeman Gp, 872 F. 2d 907 (1989) 
Ideal Toy Corporation v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)  
Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610, 622 (Kan. 1990) 
Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
Durham Industries, Inc., Plaintiff-appellee, v. Tomy Corporation, Defendant-appellant, 
630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) 
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co. 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
Computer Associates v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33369, 119 A.L.R. Fed. 
741, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 10213 (2d Cir. N.Y. Dec. 17, 1992) 
Fourth Estate Public Benefit v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, No. 16-13726 (11th Cir. 2017) 
Harney v. Sony Picture Television, Inc, 704 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2013) 
Golan v. Holder, 181 L.Ed.2d 835, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) 
Yankee Candle Co. v. The Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001) 
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Company, 429 F. 2d 1106 
Judi Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
Fuld v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) 
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) 
Tetris Holding, LLC v. XIO Interactive, Inc., 863 F.Supp.2d 394 (D.N.J. 2012) 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
Kaseberg v. Conaco, LLC et al, No. 3:2015cv01637 - Document 131 (S.D. Cal. 2017) 
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972) 
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) 
   
  -83- 
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
Balc v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014) 
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiff-appellee, v. Random House, Inc. and John Keats, 
Defendants-appellants, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (92-1292), 510 U.S. 569 (1994) 
Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, Second Circuit (2001) 
Oracle v Google, Case 3:10-cv-03561-WHA (2016) 
College Entrance Examination Bd. v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554 (N.D.N.Y 1995) 
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301 (1992) 
Elsmere Music Inc., v National Broadcasting Company Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741 (U.S. Dist. 
1980) 
Matt Hosseinzadeh v. Ethan Klein and Hila Klein No. 16-CV-3081 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017) 
Cariou v. Prince (714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., v Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc., 479 F. 
Supp. 351 (U.S. Dist. 1979) 
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Jeff Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (1993) 
Warner Bros. Inc., v. American Broadcasting Companies Inc., & Ors, 523 F. Supp. 611 
(U.S. Dist. 1981) 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936) 
CANADA 
Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Rediffusion, Inc., Ex. C.R. 382, 20 C.P.R. 75 (1954) 
Theberge v. Galerie d’ art du Petit Champlain, 2002 SCC 34 
NEW ZEALAND 
Plix Products Ltd v. Frank M. Winstone (Merchants) Ltd [1986] F.S.R. 63 (New Zealand: 
High Court), affirmed [1986] F.S.R. 608 (New Zealand: Court of Appeal), in 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/844/wipo_pub_844.pdf 
 
   
  -84- 
AUSTRALIA 
Ice TV Pty. Ltd. v. Nine Network Australia Pty. Ltd. [2009] HCA 14 
FRANCE 
Bauret v. Koons, Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (3e ch. 4e sect.), 9 mars 2017, 
Consorts Bauret c/ J. Koons, société Jeff Koons, Centre national d'art et de culture G. 
Pompidou, No. 15/01086 
 
ONLINE SOURCES 
“What is Intellectual Property”, WIPO Publication No.450(E), online available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_450.pdf  
“Understanding Industrial Property”, WIPO Publication, 2nd ed., 2016, online available 
at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_895_2016.pdf 
“Modernization of the EU copyright rules”, online available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/modernisation-eu-copyright-
rules#marketplace 
“Copyright for Creativity: A Declaration for Europe”, online available at: 
http://copyright4creativity.eu/declaration-english-version/ 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC_CopyrightPrinciples.pdf 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations/ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568348/EPRS_BRI(2015)56
8348_EN.pdf 
